OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS


What OIG Inspected
OIG inspected the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo from January 6 through March 27, 2015. Members of the team inspected U.S. Consulates in Sapporo, Osaka-Kobe, Fukuoka, and Naha and the American Presence Post in Nagoya from February 12 to March 9, 2015.

What OIG Recommended
OIG made 65 recommendations intended to improve Embassy Tokyo’s operations and programs. The report addresses the need to improve strategic planning, streamline the organization of embassy staff, and eliminate unnecessary positions. OIG recommended the embassy terminate a number of services and benefits that either are not justified or are contrary to regulations. The report also recommends strengthening management controls, communication security, and the oversight of grants management.

What OIG Found
- The Department of State has not addressed security problems, including vulnerabilities which the Office of Inspector General identified in previous inspection reports.
- The role and authorities of the Ambassador’s chief of staff are not clearly defined, leading to confusion among staff as to her level of authority, and her role in internal embassy communications.
- The embassy’s focus on daily reporting of political and economic developments comes at the expense of building a broad network of contacts and providing in-depth analysis for policy formulation.
- The embassy is not coordinating reporting and diplomatic engagement across the mission. Constituent posts in Sapporo, Nagoya, and Osaka-Kobe need to be brought up to the high standards set by posts in Fukuoka and Naha.
- The level of U.S. direct-hire staffing in the embassy’s political, economic, and consular sections is greater than workload warrants.
- The public affairs section faces major management challenges, but has begun to focus on educational exchanges and staffing adjustments to cope with the high visitor load and public outreach needs.
- American Presence Post Nagoya should cease offering routine consular services; consular operations in Fukuoka and Sapporo are inefficient.
- Although the embassy’s management section has made significant progress on cost containment, senior managers should pay greater attention to management controls over travel and official residence allowances.
- Office of Inspector General inspectors identified $122,665 in cost savings and $2,331,787 in funds put to better use during the inspection.

August 2015

Inspection of Embassy Tokyo, Japan

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Office of Inspector General
U.S. Department of State • Broadcasting Board of Governors
Inspection of Embassy Tokyo, Japan
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KEY FINDINGS

- The Department of State has not addressed security problems, including vulnerabilities which the Office of Inspector General identified in previous inspection reports.
- The role and authorities of the Ambassador’s chief of staff are not clearly defined, leading to confusion among staff as to her level of authority, and her role in internal embassy communications.
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CONTEXT

With 50,000 U.S. troops based in Japan, the United States–Japan relationship is the “cornerstone of regional peace and security” in East Asia. The United States and Japan cooperate on a broad range of global issues, including regional security, managing and responding to threats and challenges in Asia and throughout the world, development assistance, and protecting the environment and natural resources. The countries also collaborate extensively on science and technology.

Japan is the world’s fourth-largest economy overall and the second-largest advanced economy. It is our second-largest trading partner outside of North America and the second-largest source of foreign direct investment in the United States. Japan’s economy has fallen into recession four times since 2008, and the International Monetary Fund projects its growth rate at less than 1 percent for the next 2 years.

Mission Japan’s highest priority is maintaining Japanese public support for the alliance and ensuring strong communication and teamwork with the Japanese Government to help ensure continued stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The mission’s highest economic policy priority is completion of negotiations to form the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 21st-century trade agreement that will allow U.S. businesses to tap into economic opportunities in Japan and across the region. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the embassy is focused on both the bilateral and regional aspects of this milestone. Prime Minister Abe made a high-profile visit to the United States in April 2015.

Mission Japan is one of the U.S. Department of State’s (Department) most important missions in terms of its size and the U.S. interests for which it is responsible. The mission includes 13 U.S. Government agencies and 5 constituent posts: consulates general in Osaka-Kobe and Naha, consulates in Sapporo and Fukuoka, and an American Presence Post1 in Nagoya. The mission also includes the Foreign Service Institute language school in Yokohama. Headquarters of U.S. Forces Japan are located nearby at Yokota Air Base, and various U.S. military commands are located throughout the mainland and on Okinawa. The mission has 272 U.S. direct-hire employees and total employment of 727. In FY 2014, total funding for the mission, including other agencies, was $93.6 million. U.S. direct-hire employees were receiving a 25- to 35-percent cost-of-living allowance based on location at the time of the inspection.

In addition to U.S. military personnel, approximately 120,000 U.S. citizens reside in Japan. The embassy estimates the number of U.S. citizens in Japan is as high as 500,000 during peak

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1 2FAM 131 l. defines American Presence Posts as small diplomatic and consular presences of the U.S. Government in foreign countries, usually staffed by one U.S. direct-hire officer.
months for tourism. Since Japan’s earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crises in March 2011, the mission has continued to refine consular crisis plans and conducts non-combatant evacuation exercises in coordination with the U.S. Department of Defense.

LEADERSHIP

A non-career Ambassador with wide experience in nongovernmental and publishing industries leads Embassy Tokyo. She sees the strengthening of mutual understanding between the Japanese and the American people and the deepening of the security alliance as her prime responsibilities. The Ambassador does not have extensive experience leading and managing an institution the size of the U.S. Mission to Japan. She relies upon two key senior staff members—her non-career chief of staff and a career Senior Foreign Service deputy chief of mission (DCM)—to make sure that Embassy Tokyo and its constituent posts receive the resources and guidance they need to conduct day-to-day operations. The chief of staff, who has extensive experience in public relations and has worked with the Ambassador over a period of years, organizes special projects for the Ambassador, coordinates functions within the embassy, and oversees embassy staff interactions with the Ambassador. The DCM, who arrived in Tokyo 6 months before the start of the onsite inspection process, focuses on internal management of the embassy and coordination with the constituent posts.

Good Scores for Ethics

The Ambassador has made clear to the bureau’s executive office, the management officers at Embassy Tokyo, and her front office staff that she wants all her activities to be conducted in accordance with U.S. Government regulations. This was borne out by the fact that the highest score she received from staff members who completed a personal questionnaire was for her ethical behavior.

Communication Between the Front Office and Embassy Sections Needs Improvement.

On the basis of numerous interviews with embassy staff, observation of meetings, and examination of planning documents, Office of Inspector General (OIG) inspectors concluded that embassy staff members lack the guidance they need to make day-to-day decisions on optimal allocation of limited U.S. Government resources. The inspectors observed country team meetings and senior staff meetings that lacked the kind of strategic planning described in 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 1214 to provide a clear focus, establish expectations, and give staff the direction to implement agreed activities.

Although some sections have been able to get front office approval for strategic plans to implement the key goals assigned to their section, others have not been able to do so. For example, in February 2015, the Ambassador released a missionwide memo on mission goals and priorities for 2015 in which she articulated the President’s top priorities for Mission Japan, as outlined in the Integrated Country Strategy, and identified additional “key areas to help guide
our allocation of time, resources, and proactive energy.” The memo made clear that the
Ambassador planned to devote “additional focus” to a set list of activities, including the 70th
anniversary of the end of World War II. The OIG inspectors reviewed preliminary planning
documents and records of discussions with Department officials, but embassy staff was not able
to provide the inspectors with a copy of the approved strategic plan for this milestone year. The
inspectors found no evidence of dissemination of a strategic plan for this activity to those
embassy sections responsible for its implementation.

Before the arrival of the inspectors, the front office had made some headway on improving
communication by holding a town hall meeting to unveil the revised memo outlining the
activities the Ambassador would undertake. Staff members were given an opportunity to ask her
questions and to hear how her programmatic activities would support the missionwide goals in
the Integrated Country Strategy. During the course of the inspection, the Ambassador used an
expanded country team meeting, which included the constituent posts via Digital Video
Conference, to explain the background behind her agreement to participate in a television news
program filming and how she hoped the exposure would enhance understanding of the
importance of the bilateral relationship. The OIG team discussed with both the executive officers
and with heads of sections ways in which communications could be strengthened. OIG also
advised the Ambassador and her senior staff on ways to convey more effectively her vision to
the wider embassy community, as well as ways in which the Ambassador could foster an
environment conducive to an improved upward flow of information.

Role of Chief of Staff Needs Refinement

The embassy staff lacks clarity as to the role and authority of the Ambassador’s chief of staff, an
individual with experience in public relations, but not in foreign affairs. Embassy staff members
told OIG inspectors that they are unsure of the scope of her duties, lack information about the
special projects she organizes for the Ambassador, and, as a result, do not know how to allocate
their time between duties their supervisors assign and those the chief of staff assigns. The OIG
team examined the Ambassador’s use of the chief of staff as a diplomatic interlocutor with
Japanese officials, for example as note-taker in highly restricted meetings, and inspectors found
gaps in official reporting on topics discussed in these meetings. OIG inspectors advised the chief
of staff that she should be more transparent in providing the staff with an understanding of the
special projects she handles for the Ambassador and how these projects support the Integrated
Country Strategy goals. The inspectors advised the chief of staff to lead by example and foster
the highest attainable degree of employee morale and productivity, in accordance with
guidance in 3 FAM 1214 b. The OIG team advised the Ambassador to disseminate within the
embassy a position description for the chief of staff that makes clear her level of authority and
how her position relates to embassy section chiefs in terms of use of embassy resources. The
inspectors also advised the Ambassador to include a senior subject matter expert in her
meetings with high-level Japanese officials.

The OIG team found a misunderstanding on the part of the chief of staff and the Ambassador
regarding the responsibilities of an embassy public affairs operation, which include many
programmatic responsibilities in addition to performing public relations duties. This has led to
confusion and inefficiency among public affairs staff and, on occasion, to front office dissatisfaction with the support the public affairs staff provides for the Ambassador’s activities. The OIG team advised the chief of staff to familiarize herself with the role of an embassy public affairs section and the need for resources to be devoted to achievement of mission goals through coordination of public diplomacy activities with the five consulates and exchange programs, such as Fulbright and the international visitor leadership program.

*The Deputy Chief of Mission Should be More Proactive in Exercising Leadership*

The DCM, despite being still relatively new to the mission, should be more proactive in exercising leadership to get staff members the strategic direction and resources needed to implement tasks assigned to them. In particular, he needs to oversee development and execution of a strategic plan for engagement on bilateral, regional, and third country relations as well as for public diplomacy outreach. He bears responsibility for helping the Ambassador and chief of staff understand the optimal ways to accomplish her goals within both Japan and the U.S. Government interagency environment. The inspectors also advised the DCM to exercise vigilance in monitoring management controls in light of the management controls weaknesses in the use of travel and official residence expenses the inspection team identified.

*High Visibility Ambassador Puts a Strain on Some Embassy Elements*

The Ambassador, as senior public diplomacy leadership in Tokyo and Washington reports, is very popular in Japan because of her family history and Japan’s widespread respect for her father’s efforts to promote post-war reconciliation and world peace. Many sections of the embassy appropriately seek to use the Ambassador’s influence with the Japanese media to maximize the effectiveness of their programs. She and her front office staff work hard to include as many of these events in her schedule as possible, taking care to ensure that her participation is spread among as many embassy elements as possible over the course of the year. As part of her innovative approach to public diplomacy, the Ambassador has fostered new programs of interaction between Japanese and American youth to include the first “Poetry Slam” in Japan and “Team Up,” a new collaboration between Japanese and American institutions of higher learning.

The external demand for the Ambassador’s personal participation in events all across Japan has strained a number of programs at the embassy, including the gifts program, and the protocol unit. The gifts program has now caught up on the backlog of gifts sent to the Ambassador in her first 6 months in Japan and now is being run in accordance with the guidance in 2 FAM 964 and 965. The protocol section has been augmented with additional staff hours and is in the process of being relocated to offices adjacent to the front office to ease communication with the locally employed (LE) staff members.

*Employee Evaluation Reports do not Reflect Demonstrated Weaknesses*

The OIG team reviewed a range of Department employee evaluations written by managers at the U.S. Mission to Japan. They found several examples of evaluations that did not reveal any
indication of serious weaknesses, even though the rated officers had required in-depth management and or discipline by their supervisors and had absorbed time and resources from senior embassy officers. The DCM, having been at post only 6 months, has not yet produced employee evaluations. The inspectors advised him to make clear to rating officers that employee evaluations must present an accurate record of each staff member’s strengths and a realistic area for improvement.

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Organization of Political and Economic Sections

Minister Counselor Positions Under-Ranked

Embassy Tokyo’s political and economic sections implement diplomatic interactions designed to support the U.S.–Japan alliance on a daily basis. Officers with the diplomatic title of Minister Counselor lead them. However, in 2012 the Department downgraded the designated rank of both jobs from Senior Foreign Service, class of minister counselor to class of counselor. The OIG team learned that the embassy and the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs requested this change to facilitate stretch assignments by non-Senior Foreign Service FS-01 officers, because of a paucity of interested Senior Foreign Service candidates with Japanese-language skills.

According to the Department’s Position Classification Criteria for political and for economic officers, both of these positions call for a Senior Foreign Service officer. The political and the economic minister counselor positions in missions in all other Group of Seven capitals are ranked at the class of minister counselor. Tokyo’s sections are some of the largest in this group and carry responsibilities that are at least as great. Although a counselor-level officer meets these criteria, an FS-01 level officer is not required to have the broad experience and seniority needed to engage senior counterparts in the host government or to coordinate country team members from other agencies.

**Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should upgrade the rank of the economic and political minister counselor positions at Embassy Tokyo to Senior Foreign Service class of minister counselor. (Action: EAP, in coordination with DGHR)

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2 The Group of Seven major industrial democracies includes the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, and the European Union.
Economic Section Has Too Many Supervisors

Embassy Tokyo’s economic section has multiple unnecessary supervisory levels. FS-01-level unit chiefs direct the trade and economic policy unit and the environment, science, technology, and health unit. FS-02-level officers are designated as deputy unit chiefs and serve as rating officers and supervisors, principally to make these positions more attractive to mid-level officers. According to the Department’s Organizational Planning Principles contained in 1 FAM 014.5, the addition of nonessential supervisory layers increased problems associated with establishing clear delegation of responsibility and authority, transmission of information, work flow, clearances, operation costs, and morale.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Tokyo should streamline the economic section by eliminating the deputy unit chief designation in the trade and economic policy unit and in the environment, science, technology, and health unit. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

The economic section also has a stand-alone deputy position overseeing the two unit chiefs and reporting to the minister counselor. The position description states that the incumbent is the counselor of the economic section. The Department does not authorize use of this title, as required by 3 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)–1 H-2431.2 and 2434.3. This position lacks a unique substantive portfolio and engages primarily as an additional level of clearance and supervision and on special projects. This function is redundant. The 2007 Rightsizing review eliminated an economic counselor position with similar responsibilities. However, in 2010 the section merged the Trade Unit with the Economic Policy Unit and re-created the “counselor” position using the redundant unit chief position. The Embassy neither sought nor received required Department authorization for the counselor title.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Tokyo should eliminate the standalone deputy function in the economic section and assign the current incumbent of the position to lead the trade and economic policy unit. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

One economic officer is assigned to the U.S. Department of the Treasury attaché and is rated by the attaché and reviewed by the economic minister counselor. However, the position description has the officer working 75 percent for Treasury and 25 percent for the economic section. The position’s portfolio is logical, but the bifurcation of supervision is a source of friction between the economic section and the financial attaché and also results in overtasking the officer. Management principles and unity of command recommend that an employee have a single supervisor.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Tokyo should update the description for position 20466000 to eliminate the division of reporting responsibilities between the financial attaché and the economic section so that the officer reports solely to the financial attaché and through the attaché to the economic minister counselor. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

The economic section assigns supervision of each of its eight LE professional staff members to a different line officer in order to provide them with supervisory/management responsibilities. In
practice, the six economic assistants and two economic specialists provide technical expertise and continuity for multiple officers in the section’s two units. The LE staff members work with, or for, a number of officers in addition to their primary supervisor. LE staff members do not have a clear understanding of whom they report to and do not have a way to prioritize tasks different officers assign. The section loses efficiency and specialization by delegating supervisory functions instead of concentrating them in the unit chiefs who hold the supervisory function, as specified in 3 FAH-2 H-121.2.

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Tokyo should shift supervision of its locally employed economic assistants and specialists to the section’s two unit chiefs. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Some supervisory, rating, and reviewing arrangements in the economic section are inconsistent with regulations or with accepted management practices. According to 3 FAM 2242.4, “the [DCM] or principal officer or, in Washington, the appropriate office director or officer of equivalent rank will be responsible for assigning supervisory duties over entry-level officer candidates and ensuring that they are well trained and properly counseled and evaluated. In large organizations where the pressure of work makes difficult the conduct of this important responsibility, the DCM or office director may designate an appropriate counselor of embassy or deputy office director to oversee entry-level officer candidate activities.” One entry-level officer’s work requirements specified a deputy unit chief as the rating officer and the unit chief as the reviewer. Deputy unit chiefs also rate two office management specialists, who in fact report to the minister counselor and deputy section chief, respectively. The OIG team advised section leadership that their actual supervisors should rate both office management specialists and that the economic minister counselor should review the entry-level officer.

**Economic Section Portfolios Organized Poorly**

Economic section portfolios in some cases group distinctly unrelated issues. For example, labor issues are combined with intellectual property rights, and tourism (a service sector) is combined with transportation (an industrial sector). Portfolios also include “watching briefs” or issues that are no longer significant to U.S. Government interests or are inappropriate for the experience level of the position. The OIG team suggested that section leadership review the allocation of portfolio responsibilities within or between the trade and economic policy unit and the environment, science, technology, and health unit to rationalize responsibilities and staffing.

**Excess Staff in the Political and Economic Sections**

The economic section has more direct-hire officer positions than its counterparts in other embassies of comparable size and workload. Since OIG’s last inspection in 2008, the economic section has changed its organizational structure and the Department has increased staffing without regard for 1 FAM 014.1 requirements regarding effectiveness of employee use or efficiency of operations. The OIG team reviewed the section’s portfolios, compared the staffing and workload with economic sections in other Group of 7 capitals and determined that the economic section was overstaffed by one officer position. As a result, officers are underemployed and staff and resources are not used efficiently.
Recommendation 6: The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should abolish position 20439000 in the economic section effective upon the departure of the current incumbent. (Action: EAP, in coordination with DGHR)

The political section staffing pattern includes one entry-level FS-04 position assigned to the bilateral and foreign policy unit. In July 2014, prior to the arrival of the current incumbent, the front office moved this position to the public affairs section, in line with the Ambassador’s priority focus on public diplomacy and outreach. Previously, this position had been responsible for human rights, including trafficking in persons. Embassy and Department officials agreed that this portfolio was better suited to a more senior officer, and the political section reassigned the portfolio to a first secretary. According to the political minister counselor—and confirmed by inspectors’ observations—the loss of the position in the political section did not cause a gap in coverage of any portfolio. The OIG team concluded that this position is not needed in the political section and should be reassigned permanently to the public affairs section.

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should move position 10641000 from the political to the public affairs section. (Action: EAP, in coordination with DGHR)

Inconsistent Supervision of Constituent Post Political/Economic Officers

Political/economic officers assigned to Fukuoka, Osaka-Kobe, and Naha receive ratings from their respective principal officers. Their reviewing officers rotate annually among the political and economic minister counselors and the DCM. This arrangement results in a lack of continuity and does not provide for consistency in contact with the embassy or mentoring. The OIG team advised that the embassy assign reviewing responsibilities for the political/economic officers in the constituent posts to either the political or economic minister counselors, depending on the primary duties of the position.

Advocacy, Representation, and Analysis

Daily Activity Report: Widely Read But no Substitute for Analytic Reporting

The Tokyo Daily Activity Report is the Embassy’s signature reporting product, read and praised by officials of the Department and other foreign affairs agencies. The report is a digest of single-paragraph items conveying key developments and brief reports on meetings, commentary on items reported in the media, or readouts from visits and delegations. The political section is the leading contributor, followed by the economic section, but other sections and agencies as well as the constituent posts also provide input. The OIG team advised political and economic section leadership that in some cases items in the report were not breaking developments or updates but instead became a substitute for in-depth, multi-sourced reporting. The OIG team also suggested that the embassy include in the Daily Activity Report a roster of current and upcoming official visits to Japan in order to improve coordination among embassy sections and
Washington agencies and to ensure that the Department is aware of the embassy’s visit workload.

**Political Affairs**

*In-Depth, Multi-Sourced Political Reporting Needed*

Embassy Tokyo’s reporting on foreign policy, regional security, and bilateral issues is not meeting the needs of senior officials for in-depth, multi-sourced analysis. The political section is divided between the political-military affairs unit and the bilateral and foreign policy unit. Embassy Tokyo’s domestic political reporting is excellent according to U.S. Government Japan experts and policymakers who cited the embassy’s coverage of snap elections Prime Minister Abe called in late 2014. The political section drew on a broad network of contacts and coordinated reporting from the constituent posts to build an authoritative assessment. The OIG team’s review of reporting on foreign policy, regional issues, and bilateral relations found that reporting consisted largely of spot reports based primarily on contacts with Japanese Government counterparts. The OIG team found that in the 9 months prior to the OIG team’s visit to Japan, the section had produced five analytic reports. Apart from scene-setters for senior visits, the section had not produced in-depth analyses of U.S.-Japanese relations. As a result, U.S. foreign policy is not informed and guided by on-the-ground analytic reporting.

Washington officials requested more analytical reporting from Mission Japan, including in-depth, multi-sourced analysis that brings to bear the resources of this large embassy to give context to the embassy’s Daily Activity Report.

Embassy Tokyo has allowed time-sensitive work on visits, the press of internal embassy meetings, and routine business to interfere with reporting and contact development as specified in 2 FAM 113.1 c (10) and (11). Ensuring effective use of Government resources requires planning in order to meet Department priorities such as in-depth analytic reporting. According to 2 FAM 113.1 b and 3 FAM 1214 b, the chief of mission and embassy supervisors must plan strategically to ensure performance and attain goals. The mission does not have a political reporting or contact development plan or a strategy for allocating its time between this priority and the urgency of internal business and visitor support.

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Tokyo should implement a political reporting plan that includes a contact development program. (Action Embassy Tokyo)
Political-Military Affairs Unit – Supporting U.S. Forces Japan

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for all international treaty matters, including the defense agreements with the United States regarding the permanent presence of more than 50,000 U.S. troops at 9 major bases and dozens of other facilities in Japan. The primary function of the political section’s political-military affairs unit is to support U.S. Forces Japan. The unit serves as the political advisor to the three-star commander and his staff and as liaison between U.S. Forces Japan and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The unit also manages ongoing and complex bilateral military negotiations in areas as diverse as cost sharing, the environmental impact of U.S. military facilities, and base realignment. The unit works closely with the constituent posts in Osaka-Kobe, Naha, and Fukuoka to anticipate and manage civilian-military issues resulting from the U.S. military presence. Consulate General Naha is key to representing the United States in a challenging civilian-military relationship, according to senior officials, who highlight that Okinawa is critical to U.S. forward deployment in the Pacific. Senior U.S. Government officials credit the embassy over many years with contributing to the stability and political viability of basing arrangements in Japan.

Law Enforcement Working Group Lacks Political Context

Embassy Tokyo’s Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG) meets on average every 2 months and brings together all U.S. Government law enforcement agencies in Japan, including those under chief of mission authority and those under the U.S. Forces Japan military command. The embassy’s senior regional security officer chairs the LEWG. No other Department section is represented on the LEWG, although the Ambassador and the DCM have attended meetings in the course of the year prior to the OIG team’s visit. In the 2 years prior to the OIG team’s visit, the LEWG has become an increasingly active venue for information sharing for all agencies represented. The OIG team suggested that the embassy include the political section in LEWG meetings to offer political and diplomatic context to the discussions.

Economic Affairs

The economic section includes an environment, science, technology, and health unit and a trade and economic policy unit. The section works closely with the United States Trade Representative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a key objective of U.S. trade policy and the economic centerpiece of the Administration’s Asia rebalance. Conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is predicated on bilateral negotiations between the United States and Japan. Washington stakeholders confirm that the Minister Counselor and the section have performed strongly in advancing these interests.

Reporting and Advocacy Needed on Structural Reform

U.S. policymakers have determined that the revitalization of Japan’s huge economy is of direct interest to the United States. The Prime Minister’s policy includes monetary, fiscal, and structural “arrows.” According to Washington officials, the embassy’s Treasury attaché and the Foreign
Service officer assigned to the Treasury office at the embassy effectively cover the first two “arrows” in terms of reporting and advocacy. However, Washington end users would like more analytical reporting and advocacy on the “third arrow,” the structural reform of the Japanese economy. These issues cut across a variety of sectors and require coordination among economic officers and with other economic agencies at post.

One area in which the section succeeded is advocacy in support of “womenomics,” Prime Minister Abe’s push to strengthen the economy by providing greater economic opportunities for women. Women’s empowerment is a priority of the Ambassador. The economic section formed and led an interagency gender working group, which worked with the front office on a series of events to leverage the Ambassador’s convening power to contribute to this aspect of Japan’s structural reform effort. The economic section followed up this effort by developing an engagement plan on energy issues, another priority of the Ambassador.

The economic section’s reporting relies heavily on media sources. On some policy developments, the OIG team found that embassy reporting did not add value to more timely reporting by the international press. Inspectors reviewed 9 months of reporting and found cables cited a limited range of Japanese contacts—primarily government officials in a few ministries. Reporting was mostly single-sourced and did not evidence a range of contacts among Japanese business leaders, legislators or staff, political parties, academia, or other economic leaders or decision makers, as intended by 2 FAM 113.1 c (10) and (11). The OIG team found that the economic section reporting plan was primarily a planning calendar of projected visits, meetings, and events, many of which resulted in spot reporting. According to 2 FAM 113.1 (b) and 3 FAM 1214 b, the chief of mission and embassy supervisors must plan strategically to ensure performance and attain goals. The economic section reporting plan listed analytic reporting, but the section had not reserved time from the press of visits and routine business for these projects, including contacts development.

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Tokyo should update its economic reporting plan and focus resources on contact development and analytical reporting. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Economic Section Not Keeping Proper Records and Files**

The economic section is not maintaining centralized files. Officers have individual files based on their own filing systems, located in personal folders on a shared drive and in Microsoft Outlook email personal folders. These files are not accessible to anyone else and are not archived, retired, or retrievable. Embassy Tokyo does not have a current records management policy and does not enforce Department and Federal regulations on records management. The Federal Records Act and 5 FAM 400 require the Department to create and preserve records. Language in 5 FAM 400 and 5 FAH-4 H-214 requires a standardized filing by year and by subject category.

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3 Codified at 44 U.S.C.§§3101-3107 and 3301-3314
and geographic location for preserving record material, which includes substantive email reporting or deliberative process messages that are not sent by record email and should be incorporated into these files.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Tokyo should implement a standardized filing system for the economic section that uses common-use drives or folders. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Economic and Science Agency Coordination Lacking**

In addition to the economic section, the other entities representing U.S. economic interests at the embassy are the Treasury attaché, the minister counselors of the Foreign Commercial Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service, and a representative of the U.S. Agency for International Development. Representing U.S. science and technology interests, in addition to the environment, science, technology, and health unit of the economic section, are representatives of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy attaché.

Embassy Tokyo’s several economic and science offices do not coordinate jointly on policy issues or broad mission goals. The exception is commercial advocacy, which the Foreign Commercial Service coordinates through a well-focused Interagency Commercial Task Force that includes substantial contributions by economic officers. Some other large embassies use an economic or science cluster to ensure coordination. Embassy Tokyo has not used this approach under the current Ambassador, DCM, or economic minister counselor. Lack of senior coordination and communication has led to friction among agency offices, communication problems between these agencies and the front office and weakening of the coordinated U.S. Government engagement, According to the Department’s Position Classification Criteria for senior economic officers, as well as the work requirements of Tokyo’s economic minister counselor, that officer is responsible for ensuring coordination with the economic and science agencies.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Tokyo should establish a regular science cluster and an economic policy cluster coordinated by the economic minister counselor (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Constituent Posts’ Reporting is Uneven**

The OIG team reviewed 9 months of political and economic reporting by Mission Japan’s five constituent posts. Consulates in Naha, Fukuoka, and Osaka-Kobe have full-time reporting officers in addition to principal officers and public affairs officers. Consulate Naha, implementing its reporting plan, produced more than 50 cables that focused mostly on military basing issues but also included topics such as economic policy, trade, and youth outreach. Consulate Fukuoka, also implementing its reporting plan, produced 34 reporting cables with broad coverage of economic, political, security, environmental, and social issues. On the basis of drafting criteria the Foreign Service Institute uses, the OIG team judged Consulate Fukuoka’s cables to be some of the best work of the mission and a model for what a small consulate can accomplish.
Mission Japan’s constituent posts in Osaka-Kobe, Sapporo, and Nagoya produced minimal reporting during the 9-month period leading up to the OIG team’s visit to Japan. Embassy Tokyo did not require constituent posts to prepare or follow reporting plans, though constituent posts in Fukuoka and Naha did so on their own. The OIG team found that, despite ample staffing, Consulate General Osaka-Kobe transmitted only seven reporting cables during this period. Osaka-Kobe also produced a periodic regional update via a SharePoint site, but the Department’s Japan desk was not aware that this information was available because it was not sent by cable or email. Consulate General Sapporo, with a consular-management-economic officer in addition to the principal officer and a public affairs officer, produced two political cables and three economic cables. The American Presence Post in Nagoya, with one officer, sent only one reporting cable during the 9-month period reviewed. Washington officials and Embassy Tokyo staff said they were not receiving adequate information and analysis from these posts.

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Tokyo should require each principal officer to draft a reporting plan that includes reporting performance in principal officers’ performance evaluations. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Inefficiencies in Managing VIP Visits**

The embassy receives a large number of high-level official visitors each year, including congressional delegations, cabinet officials, delegations led by other agencies, and military visitors. Managing these visits is complex and time consuming.

Political and economic officers reported they spend as much as 20 percent of their time supporting visitors as control officers, and they noted that this activity significantly impacts their ability to fulfill their primary reporting responsibilities.

The embassy has a travel-visitor unit that is responsible for logistical arrangements for visitors. The interface between that unit and the control officer, however, does not always function efficiently. The OIG team advised the embassy to review current practices for managing VIP visits with the goal of improving efficiencies.

**Public Diplomacy**

The public affairs section is struggling to get back on its feet. In the past 8 months, four of seven officers in the public affairs section assigned to Tokyo have left post before their tour end date. The LE staff members express dismay at the many changes in public affairs leadership and claim that they have not come to terms with staff cuts that began in 2009 and were deepened in 2012. The resulting work environment presents management challenges for the public affairs section in a country where high-level visits are a weekly event and the media is keenly focused on the Ambassador’s every movement.

In 2011, the Department realigned public affairs resources around the world, resulting in a redistribution of public diplomacy allotments within each of the geographic bureaus. Because of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011, cuts to Mission Japan’s public
affairs budget were delayed until 2012. The public affairs section was told to take a 26-percent cut. This reduced the public diplomacy allotment from $11.5 million in FY 2011 to $8.6 million in FY 2012. Even at that reduced rate, Mission Japan’s public affairs budget was still the largest in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. As a result of these budget cuts, the public affairs section eliminated 17 LE staff positions. The public affairs section allocated 68 percent of its FY 2014 budget of $8.5 million to LE staff salaries. According to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, this is high by world standards.

The country public affairs officer has concluded that the section needs help in managing change expectations that linger as a result of the 2012 budget cuts. The OIG team suggested requesting assistance in the Department or from a Tokyo-based professional, and the public affairs officer concurs.

No Public Diplomacy Strategy

The public affairs section does not have a public diplomacy strategy. As a result, public affairs staff members indicate they do not have a clear understanding of the vision of what the front office wants to accomplish in Japan. Several reasons exist for this lack of strategy: public affairs leadership is still coming to terms with personnel issues, front office support requirements, and LE staff members’ requests for clear guidance on the section’s goals. The public affairs section will benefit when the front office clearly communicates its vision so that the public affairs section can develop a strategy and a roadmap indicating how to accomplish those goals. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, in a worldwide message, urged public affairs officers to use a public diplomacy implementation plan to create a missionwide public diplomacy strategy. Such a strategy would enable collaboration with other embassy elements and facilitate implementation of policy priorities.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Tokyo should develop and implement a public diplomacy strategy. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

The Ambassador selected the country public affairs officer, who arrived in Tokyo in August 2014, to stabilize the public affairs section, end the curtailments, define LE staff duties in order to clarify the new distribution of duties following the 2012 staff cuts, bring transparency to personnel decisions, and get the entire staff’s commitment to move forward. Since the public affairs officer’s arrival, the public affairs section has had considerable success, particularly with programs on educational exchange and women’s issues. In accordance with President Obama’s and Prime Minister Abe’s initiative to double student exchanges by 2020, and at the request of the front office, the section generated “Team Up,” a year-long initiative to increase the number of U.S. and Japanese undergraduate students studying in each other’s countries by pairing up institutions of higher education. The section’s ConnectUSA is a youth-oriented social media account that daily engages 35,000 followers on Twitter. More than 80,000 people have viewed the section’s eight-episode series of videos on YouTube. The section, inspired by the Ambassador, organized a poetry slam broadcast by satellite to bring together young people based in Tokyo and Brooklyn. The section organized the continuation of the Tomodachi MetLife Women’s Leadership program, which mentors Japanese female undergraduate students. The
section also live-streamed the 2014 U.S. mid-term elections to as many as 300,000 viewers per
day in partnership with Japan's largest Web-streaming platform.

To carry out the Presidential initiative to increase student exchanges, the public affairs section
has requested in the FY 2017 Mission Resource Request an additional direct-hire deputy Cultural
Affairs officer 02 position to enhance educational diplomacy and administer and monitor grants.
The OIG team concurs with this request.

**Cultural and Exchange Programs**

**American Center Japan Not Included in Public Diplomacy Planning**

The American Center Japan does not appear in the integrated country strategy or the public
diplomacy implementation plan—the two public diplomacy planning instruments. The public
affairs section has not made a strong case for including the American Center in its overall public
outreach strategy in order to justify fully the $1.3-million annual cost of running the center. The
Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) pays $448,000 per year for rent; the public
affairs budget pays $260,000 per year for programs and maintenance and $586,000 for LE staff
salaries. In 2012, the Department objected to
the center’s high cost and marginal use. The
embassy refurbished the center in early 2014 at a cost of $86,000 for furniture (from the public
affairs budget) and $107,500 for carpeting and office equipment (from the embassy program
budget). The center re-opened in March 2014. Without making a case in the public affairs
strategy for the American Center Japan’s importance in furthering embassy goals, future funding
for the center could be jeopardized.

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Tokyo should incorporate fully the American Center Japan
into its public affairs strategy. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Inspectors examined data from American Centers in embassies of comparable size and
importance to U.S. policy interests in Beijing, Seoul, and Jakarta and found that the American
Center Japan is similar in terms of the following factors:

- cost;
- management by direct hire,
- number of LE staff members or contractor staff members;
- ease of public access and whether the public can bring in personal electronic devices;
- hours of operation and whether evening programs exist;
- attendance numbers; and
- frequency of use by other Federal agencies or sections.

The OIG team observed four programs at the busy Japan Center during the inspection. These
included two poetry events hosted by the Ambassador, an evening college recruitment class by
edUSA personnel, and one Tomodachi initiative event.
The OIG team reviewed the staffing of the American Center and concluded that the center does not need a full-time direct-hire director. Of the three comparable American Centers in the region, only Beijing has a direct-hire center director. One model the embassy might consider is the Moscow American Center, which has is a local-hire U.S. citizen director. The OIG team concluded that changing the staffing of the center would reduce the number of reference librarians and increase the number of LE staff program assistants.

**Tomodachi Initiative**

The U.S. Government response to the 2011 disaster in Japan was called “Operation Tomodachi.” Embassy Tokyo then partnered with the U.S.-Japan Council to launch the Tomodachi Initiative, a public-private partnership that engages the private sector in promoting U.S.-Japan youth exchange programs. The Tomodachi Initiative has attracted more than $40 million in private-sector contributions. More than 2,300 young Japanese and American students have participated in exchange programs to each other’s countries, and more than 10,000 young Japanese youth have participated in Tomodachi programs in Japan. Tomodachi directly supports several embassy exchanges goals that would not be funded without Tomodachi participation. The OIG team concurs with the embassy plan for the Tomodachi Initiative to be more self-sustaining by seeking office space outside the embassy.

**No Internal Speakers Program**

The public affairs section does not have an internal speakers program. Most embassies have speakers programs, which schedule speaking engagements in which embassy officers address the public on a variety of topics. The embassy previously had a speakers bureau that performed this function, but it was abolished as a result of the 2012 budget cuts. The embassy staff includes a number of American officers who possess strong Japanese-language skills. Many of them are experts in fields of professional and human interest. Failure to take advantage of this valuable resource is a lost opportunity to use a proven strategy to meet outreach goals.

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Tokyo should establish an internal speakers program.

( Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Information Programs**

**Media Analysis and Translation Team Lacks a Clear Mandate**

The embassy’s 11-person Media Analysis and Translation Team (MATT) creates 4 daily information products that are considered excellent in quality. However, it is unclear whether these products are needed to serve the embassy’s objectives. The embassy has not conducted a customer survey for the daily MATT products since 2011. With input from a new customer survey, the embassy could conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the MATT’s four daily products are all needed.

The MATT is a legacy unit that moved from the political section into the public affairs section 11 years ago. It consists of eight LE translators, who formerly worked in the political section and
who are funded out of program funds, and a three-person group of LE information assistants, who are funded with public affairs funds. The group of three produces three items per day:

- *Japan A.M. Highlights*, a summary of the morning newspapers;
- *Japan Watch*, a summary of the previous evening’s television news shows; and
- a media reaction piece that conforms to the decades-old U.S. Information Agency-style brief summaries of U.S.-Japan related items.

In addition, the eight translators produce an afternoon product called *Japan Press Highlights* that translates or gives an abridged translation of articles in the afternoon Tokyo press. These daily products are not analysis, but rather translations and summaries. The quality of these daily products is excellent, according to staff of the Okinawa-based Open Source Center, which characterized the MATT products as among the best in the business.

OIG compared Tokyo’s MATT with similar operations at other embassies in the East Asia Pacific region and found that these other embassies produce similar products with fewer employees. Jakarta’s four-person team produces two daily items and performs translation services. Beijing’s five-person team produces one daily item and a biweekly summary of articles and does translations. Seoul has a three-person team that produces headline alert emails, an early alert news summary, a media reaction and press bulletin, and does translations.

Without a survey of the MATT’s customers, the embassy cannot confirm who—if anyone—is reading its products or justify the $1.25-million annual cost of operating the MATT. According to 1 FAM 014.1 a, organizational structures should strive to achieve a proper balance for effective use of Government resources. This includes ensuring the most effective use of Government resources and striving to achieve a proper balance among mission needs, efficiency of operations, and effective employee use.

**Recommendation 16:** The embassy should conduct a customer survey and a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the Media Analysis and Translation Team’s products are needed to further embassy goals. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Contributing to this lack of clarity, the MATT operates without the benefit of a mission statement or clear written guidelines to define the scope of its work and set priorities. The embassy has not developed these guidelines. Although the embassy’s information officer provides nominal supervision, it is the MATT’s LE chief rather than the information officer who determines what work is performed. In the absence of written guidelines that define the work, the LE chief determines the nature of staff members’ assignments and develops priorities. Although the MATT’s name indicates it is a translation unit, the unit does not normally do translations for other non-Department agencies in the embassy.

According to 1 FAM 014.8, organizational structures are required to have functional statements that define the area of responsibility of an organizational unit, distinguish its activities from those of related units, and eliminate potential overlap and duplication.
During the inspection, the embassy revised the information officer’s position description to make more explicit her responsibility for oversight of the MATT group.

**Recommendation 17:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, should develop a scope of work and establish clear guidelines governing the work of the Media Analysis and Translation Team. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with EAP)

The MATT staff members report that they do not have regular staff meetings. After the MATT chief attends political or economic section meetings, he sometimes briefs the MATT colleagues by email indicating what topics were discussed; however, even then, the MATT staff does not receive any feedback on why topics were discussed or what conclusions were made. The free flow of conversation, which would allow staff members to explore mission priorities or to offer fresh ideas on how to achieve goals, is absent. The OIG team advised the MATT chief to hold regular meetings with the MATT staff.

**Social Media**

Japan has the fourth-largest Internet population in the world, with nearly 80 percent of its population older than 6 years of age engaging in online activities. Television and newspapers remain the dominant sources of news in Japan. Additionally, the five largest newspapers published in Japan range in daily circulation from 1.6 million (Sankei Shimbun) to 9.9 million (Yomiuri Shimbun). The latest figures, from the September 2014 review by the Japanese Audit Bureau of Circulations, however, indicate that general newspaper subscriptions have dropped every year since 2010 because younger readers are turning to social media with the increased adoption of smartphones. The Open Source Center’s Japan Social Media Guide 2014 notes that Japanese political parties have increased their activity on social networking services to build rapport with their supporters and to amplify their policy messages. The Prime Minister’s Facebook account has 426,000 followers.

**Social Media Lacks Coordination**

The public affairs section’s social media work is not coordinated. As a result, the public affairs section does not handle social media as effectively as it could. Several LE staff members work separately with social media, resulting in a multiplicity of uncoordinated messages: the MATT staff monitors social media for content; a media program specialist covers youth outreach via Facebook and Twitter accounts; a Cultural Affairs assistant creates live streaming forums that feature programs on U.S. culture and society; and a visual communications specialist produces videos highly praised by the front office. Establishing a unified U.S. mission presence on digital and social media will enhance the public affairs section’s efforts to do the following:

- coordinate public outreach efforts featuring youth as the target audience;
- coordinate the work being done in social media by the consulates;
- pull together the social media work done by the consular section and other agencies and embassy elements;

- coordinate social media activities to incorporate the Ambassador’s public outreach and to obtain direct feedback from the public.

This is in keeping with Under Secretary Stengel’s October 2013 message (13 State 144456) that an overarching strategic plan for social media engagement is essential to ensure that a mission’s commitment of personnel and program resources delivers a measurable return on investment. The mission should set goals, determine the objectives that will advance those goals, define a mechanism for creating a common narrative and voice, establish measurements of success, and ensure proper management and oversight structures are in place.

In other embassies, an LE staff member responsible for the official U.S. mission presence on digital and social media has fulfilled this coordination role.

**Recommendation 18:** Embassy Tokyo should designate a locally employed staff position in the public affairs section to act as coordinator for digital and social media activities. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Grants Management Not in Compliance**

In January 2015, the director of the Office of the Procurement Executive of the Federal Assistance Division in the Department (A/OPE) visited Tokyo at the invitation of the public affairs section. He reviewed grants and met with those who administer the public affairs section’s grants program. He concluded the following: files were incomplete; forms were not filled out completely; standard forms were missing; written standard operating procedures did not exist; monitoring plans were absent; often reports did not exist on how funds were expended; and Federal assistance awards were not being closed out formally. OIG conducted its own review of public affairs section grants files. OIG concurs with the conclusions reached in the A/OPE report and advised the public affairs officer to review the A/OPE Japan trip report. In FY 2014, the public affairs section managed grants with a combined value of more than $1.2 million. (OIG noted its concern about management and oversight of grants Departmentwide in a Management Alert issued in September 2014.)

The public affairs officer inherited a flawed grants process, as evidenced by the A/OPE report. At the time of the inspection, she was beginning to take measures to correct the problems. She made sure that training is up to date, changed the position description of her assistant to add grants work, clarified to the LE staff the duties of the grants officer representative to ensure that

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4 U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General Management Alert (Grants Management Deficiencies), September 26, 2014.
grants are monitored and recorded in the files. The LE staff member responsible for administering the grants program is the administrative advisor. His position description was last updated 10 years ago. It indicates he is supposed to spend 30 percent of his work time on the preparation and execution of grants. He is also responsible for the section’s budget. As a grants officer representative, he continues to sign grants officer representative letters but informed OIG inspectors that he does not have to monitor grants. Neglect of the requirement to monitor grants can lead to abuse of funds and contradicts grants policy directive 42 on monitoring, which states it is the responsibility of the grants officer representative, in consultation with the grants officer, to develop a monitoring plan that is appropriate for the program.

**Recommendation 19:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should comply with Department of State regulations and directives for grants management oversight, including scheduling periodic review by grants officers and grants officer representatives. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

**Consular Affairs**

The embassy and five constituent posts provide consular services in Japan. The consular sections range from Tokyo’s large, full-service consular sections and Naha’s small full-service operation, to Fukuoka, Sapporo, and Nagoya, which provide limited consular services. In FY 2014, the mission adjudicated 18,500 passports and consular report of birth applications and attended to some 240 U.S. citizen prisoners. Countrywide, it issued 2,318 immigrant visas and processed more than 103,000 nonimmigrant visa applications.

Japan processes the greatest number of complex E visas (Treaty Trader/Investor) in the world (nearly 14,000 in FY 2014), and the resident American citizen population numbers approximately 223,000, of which 104,425 are active duty U.S. military personnel and their dependents located on bases throughout the country. Crisis management planning is a mission focus, considering Japan’s history of natural and manmade disasters and the large number of private U.S. citizens in Japan. The embassy estimates the number of U.S. citizens in Japan is as high as 500,000 during the peak months for tourism.

The consular section incorporates lessons learned from the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crises in its training and crisis management exercises. Consular personnel regularly engage in crisis-planning activities with host country authorities, representatives of U.S. Forces in Japan, and Embassy Seoul, as well as other elements in the embassy.

Japan is second only to Mexico in the number of children abducted from the United States. Japan’s accession to The Hague Convention on International Parental Child Abduction in 2014 was a significant development, due in no small part to Embassy Tokyo’s efforts to encourage

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5 As of March 13, 2015, the Department consolidated all Grants Policy Directives, including Grants Policy Directive 42, into the Federal Assistance Policy Directive.
Japan to join. Although it is too early to assess Japan’s performance in implementing the Convention, the consular section continues to engage with the Japanese Central Authority and others. A mid-level officer position was established in Tokyo to provide coverage for cases arising under the Convention, as well as nearly 100 pre-existing cases not covered under it.

Generous staffing makes it possible for consular personnel across the mission to undertake an ambitious schedule of outreach, contact work, and off-site services. Of the 250 events that the MCCA reported consular staff participated in during 2014, 160 focused on promoting educational opportunities in the United States. Although this is not a core consular function, it is a mission priority. The Consular staff in Tokyo also travels regularly to U.S. military bases—some less than 2 hours from the embassy—to provide passport, birth registration, and notarial services.

**Consular Management and Staffing**

The Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs (MCCA) is responsible for coordination and oversight of consular operations throughout Japan. He visits each constituent post several times a year to meet with staff, observe consular activities, and provide guidance and mentoring. This frequent interaction enabled him to resolve difficult personnel issues at several constituent posts. The MCCA also hosts an annual workshop for consular personnel from across the mission to promote communication and coordination. He reinforces priorities in periodic digital video conferences with the consular sections. Although the visa and American citizens services unit chiefs in Tokyo serve as subject matter experts in their respective fields, interviews with officers at the smaller consular sections indicated the roles are not always clearly understood. The OIG team advised the MCCA of the need to reinforce their roles as missionwide coordinators to officers in the constituent post consular sections.

**Consular Officer Staffing Is Excessive**

Tokyo’s consular section, with 14 officers, has more officer positions than other consular operations of similar workload, with a high proportion of managers to entry-level officers. Both the visa and American citizens services units have unit chiefs and deputy unit chiefs. Two levels of supervision are unnecessary. According to 1 FAM 014.5, organizational layers should be limited to the minimum number required for effective span of control and performance of the mission. The Embassy has not reduced or adjusted officer staffing levels commensurate with workload. Elimination of these two deputy unit chief positions would streamline supervision and would reduce overall officer staffing to a level commensurate with Tokyo’s workload.

**Recommendation 20:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should request that the Bureau of Human Resources eliminate the deputy unit chief positions in the visa and American citizens services units (position numbers 31144000 and 34657000) when the incumbents complete their tours. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CA)

Embassy Tokyo’s immigrant visa workload has declined in recent years, although the American citizens services unit needs additional LE staff members to keep up with its workload. Currently,
LE staff members from the immigrant visa unit are detailed to the American citizens services unit to respond to work surges. This arrangement does not address the longer term shift in work demand. The OIG team advised the MCCA to address this issue by reprogramming positions.

**Supervision of Consular Communications Unit Does Not Reflect Its Wider Mandate**

The consular communications unit originally dealt only with visa matters. Its mandate has expanded in recent years. Currently, the unit responds to queries from customers about the full range of consular topics, including American citizens services, as well as immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, and it coordinates a wide range of outreach activities and social media. The unit’s supervisor, however, has remained the visa chief. Keeping the unit under the visa chief inhibits its role in integrating activities for the consular section as a whole as well as coordinating social media interaction with constituent posts. Language in 7 FAH, 1, H-134 recommends establishing correspondence units apart from the traditional functional units in consular sections with large volumes of public inquiries.

**Recommendation 21:** Embassy Tokyo should shift direct supervision of the consular communication unit to the Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Consular Operations**

**No Coordination of Consular Social Media**

The consular communications and American citizens services units share responsibility for the consular portion of the mission Web site. Sectionwide coordination does not exist. Additionally, the consular sections in Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe, Naha, and Fukuoka have individual Facebook or Twitter accounts for consular activities, but not all of them are regularly updated. As a result, some of them are all but inactive, reducing their utility to customers. The OIG team advised the MCCA to consolidate Web site and social media maintenance and to make Tokyo’s consular communications unit responsible for their operation. In addition, the OIG team suggested that consular messaging be coordinated with the public affairs section’s efforts to reorganize social media activities. This would provide better quality coverage countrywide.

**Inefficient Passport Processing**

A Consular Management and Assistance Team that visited Japan in October 2014 found the embassy had an 8-week backlog of passport applications that had not been transmitted to the Department for printing. By the time of the inspection, the passport unit had processed all cases in this backlog, but was taking up to 1 week to transmit some categories of applications. According to 7 FAM 1363 b (6), no post may store passport applications longer than 1 working day before transmitting them. Following advice from the Consular Management and Assistance Team, Tokyo’s passport unit has undertaken a wide-ranging series of measures aimed at reducing passport processing time. As a result, the unit was well on the way to meeting this requirement.
The OIG team found that most of the constituent posts were processing passport applications inefficiently, for example, accepting applications filled out by hand rather than electronically and not using mail-in procedures for passport renewals. The OIG team advised managers to implement a number of measures that the Bureau of Consular Affairs recommends to reduce the time consular staff spends on routine tasks. This will enable them to concentrate on other duties.

Consular managers cannot perform adjudication reviews of approved passport applications as required by an update to 7 FAM 1368.1 b published in August and September 2014. An audit review function needed to carry out this action does not yet exist in the Consular Consolidated Database. Consular managers at Embassy Tokyo and other missions have requested that the Bureau of Consular Affairs provide guidance on how to comply with this requirement. The bureau has not yet responded. In the absence of guidance, consular managers cannot ensure uniform and correct application of applicable law and regulations.

**Recommendation 22:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should provide guidance to consular managers regarding how to comply with Department requirements to review issued passport applications. (Action: CA)

**Routine Consular Services Inappropriate for American Presence Post**

American Presence Post Nagoya offers routine American citizens services once per month. These include passports, consular reports of birth abroad, and notarial services. Embassy Tokyo began offering these services, with the consent of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, when Consulate General Osaka-Kobe ceased monthly visits to interview applicants in Nagoya. This practice is in contradiction of 2 FAM 133, which states American presence posts have limited staffing and narrow objectives and notes that no routine consular services should be performed. Carrying out such services diverts staff from focusing on specified objectives. Additionally, Nagoya’s physical space does not meet security standards for consular activities.

**Recommendation 23:** Embassy Tokyo should cease offering routine consular services at American Presence Post Nagoya. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Inefficient Consular Operations in Fukuoka and Sapporo**

The consulates at Fukuoka and Sapporo process modest numbers of visa and American citizens services cases. In reviewing worldwide consular workloads, the OIG team found that only one other consulate (Ponta del Gada, located in the Azores) had so few cases. Consular personnel at the consulates in Fukuoka and Sapporo have not adopted modern consular workload management practices, and the low workload makes economies of scale difficult. Additionally, officers in Fukuoka and Sapporo who perform consular services have other responsibilities, and consular work limits the time they can devote to these other responsibilities. Although customers in these areas benefit from routine services close by, consular operations are inefficient, and data are not available to determine whether the volume of work justifies the time and resources devoted to them. These services could be provided more efficiently in Osaka-Kobe and Tokyo, which are already staffed and equipped to absorb these workloads. According to 1 FAM 014.1, proper use of Government resources requires a balance among mission needs,
efficiency of operations and effective employee use. In addition, according to 7 FAH-1 H-263.1, a basic concept of managing workload is to reduce it as much as possible by eliminating inefficiencies that create more work and consolidating or eliminating unnecessary operations.

**Recommendation 24:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of providing consular services in Fukuoka and Sapporo. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CA)
# Resource Management

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<th>Agency</th>
<th>U.S. Direct-Hire Staff (authorized)</th>
<th>U.S. Local-Hire Staff (authorized)</th>
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Source: Embassy Tokyo

### Management Operations

In terms of cost containment, the minister counselor for management affairs has eliminated two high-cost U.S. direct-hire positions: the deputy financial management officer and information management systems officer. He is evaluating eliminating two additional U.S. direct-hire positions: the deputy facility manager and an assistant general services officer. He has outsourced 70 percent of the voucher and 100 percent of the LE staff position classifications workload to Department regional centers. Management maximizes the use of contractors and has outsourced maintenance, janitorial, and gardening services.
Since 2008, mission staffing decreased by a net 11 positions: a decrease of 20 U.S. direct-hire positions, an increase of 8 U.S. direct-hire staff members and 1 LE staff member.

Communication and Coordination

The minister counselor for management affairs has traveled to the five consulates at least annually during his 3-year tenure. He conducts monthly digital video conferences and telephone conferences with the five consulate management officers to coordinate action, share information, and discuss missionwide issues. The consulate management officers uniformly praised the support the minister counselor and his staff provide to their constituent posts.

Customer Satisfaction

Despite some anecdotal customer complaints in OIG and Mission Japan surveys, Mission Japan received good customer satisfaction scores on average. In 2015, the combined missionwide scores on the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) survey exceeded 4.0 on a 1–5 scale in 21 of 30 services. Overall ICASS services, procurement services, basic package, community liaison office, vouchering, payrolling, accounts and records, and human resources—LE staff—were slightly below 4.0, from 3.99 to 3.86. Travel services were below the regional and worldwide averages.

Yokohama Language Program

Cost-Benefit Analysis Lacking

Data are unavailable to determine whether it is more cost-effective for the Foreign Service Institute to provide Japanese-language training in house at the Institute’s language school in Yokohama because the Institute has not performed a formal cost study. The school in Yokohama trains Foreign Service officers in a 1-year program that follows their first year of Japanese study at the Institute’s main campus in Arlington, Virginia. The Yokohama school is one of three in-house language schools that the Institute operates overseas. The Institute outsources its other overseas language programs—in Chinese (Beijing) and Arabic—to commercial vendors.

Other foreign missions in Tokyo procure Japanese-language instruction commercially from Japanese vendors or offer study solely in their own countries. To provide Japanese-language instruction in Yokohama, it costs the Department an estimated $2.3 million per year. The total cost of operating the school, factoring out fixed expenses, such as leasing residences for the students, post allowance, education allowance, the school director’s salary and benefits, and other sunk costs, is $1 million per year. This translates into a per-student cost of from $83,583 to $200,599 for a student body of from 5 to 12 students. The Department could be incurring higher costs for providing language services.

According to 5 FAM 913 c, competitive sourcing is the process of studying the cost of public versus private-sector performance, with the ultimate goal being to ensure efficient and effective U.S. Government services. Competitive sourcing is not simply outsourcing (contracting out), but
rather the analysis of whether commercial activities are best performed in-house or by contractors. The competitive sourcing process could result in retaining a function within the Department or outsourcing it, depending on which makes better business sense. OMB Circular A-76 establishes Governmentwide policy on competitive sourcing.

**Recommendation 25:** The Foreign Service Institute, in coordination with Embassy Tokyo, should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it should outsource or continue to perform in house the overseas portion of the Japanese-Language training program. (Action: FSI, in coordination with Embassy Tokyo)

**Financial Management Operation**

In 2014, to contain cost, the embassy transferred 70 percent of its voucher processing to the Department’s regional voucher processing center. The cost to process a voucher in Japan is three times higher than at the regional center. The transfer resulted in the elimination of at least two voucher examiner positions.

**Inconsistencies in Billing Methods Creates Confusion**

The financial management staff uses two methods to bill overtime worked on representational events: monthly and per event, which makes overtime difficult to track. The OIG team counseled the staff to use one procedure. The inspectors also reminded the financial management staff that no more than 50 percent of guests on representational event guest lists should be Executive Branch employees and their families. This is to ensure that the event is representational in purpose and complies with 3 FAM 3240. As noted in 3 FAM 3241.1 a, the purpose of representation allowances is to enable the Department and the Foreign Services to provide for the proper representation of the United States, thus furthering foreign policy objectives. This is the only reason for the availability of such funds and the only criterion for their use.

**Cashiering Violation and Fiscal Irregularity**

The embassy disclosed that the former Class B cashier resigned in January 2015 to avoid disciplinary action for abusing accommodation exchange services. The regional security officer investigated the incident and referred the case to Diplomatic Security/Office of Special Investigations, which deemed the case a violation of cashier regulations and an administrative error rather than a criminal offense. Subsequently, the financial management officer discovered a shortage of $700 in the former cashier’s accountability and declared a fiscal irregularity. The Department’s Committee of Inquiry into Fiscal Irregularities will review the case to determine whether the embassy should seek restitution from the former cashier or resolve the case administratively, in accordance with 4 FAM 370.

**Justification Lacking for Providing In-house Accommodation Exchange Services**

The embassy provides accommodation exchange but has not documented the reason for providing this service in house. The embassy did not seek the Ambassador’s approval to provide
this service. According to 4 FAH-3 H-361.2, the chief of mission should determine whether accommodation exchange services will be provided, taking into consideration whether adequate, secure, and convenient local banking or automated teller machines are available. Post management has been remiss in not providing a justification to maintain and embassy cashier to provide accommodation exchange services. According to cable 2009 State 067873, providing this service in-house is resource intensive and places additional cash advance liability and risk on posts. The cable also states, posts should perform this service in-house only where deemed necessary, the service should be limited to the extent possible, and it should be reviewed critically.

**Recommendation 26:** Embassy Tokyo should justify its rationale for providing in-house accommodation exchange and determine whether it should continue. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

*Class B Cashier’s Cash Advance is Excessive*

The Class B cashier advance of exceeds the level of cash needed. The embassy did not perform a review of cash needs after the cashier’s resignation. According to 4 FAH-3 H-393.4-2(d), when conditions warrant, an increase or decrease in the amount of a cashier’s advance authorization or a revised official designation must be processed with justification in the same manner as initial designation. According to 4 FAH-3 H-393.4-2 c, the advance may not exceed the actual needs of the cashier. Normally, the amount of the advance is the amount of funds the cashier requires for 1 week’s activity, plus an amount sufficient to cover replenishment turnaround time. Under no circumstance may the advance exceed the average cash disbursements for a 1-month period. The excessive cash advance exposes the embassy to greater liability and risk. The U.S. Disbursing Officer is responsible for determining the amount of the cash advance.

**Recommendation 27:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should conduct a review of cash requirements to determine an adequate level of the cashier’s permanent advance. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CGFS)

*Salaries Inappropriately Paid Directly to Official Residence Expense Staff*

Japanese law prohibits payment of employees in cash so the embassy opted to pay the official residence expense staff by electronic funds transfer directly to their bank accounts. However, the embassy has not pursued an alternative procedure to allow the Ambassador and the DCM to pay their staffs directly. Paying the official residence expense staff directly by the embassy establishes an employer-employee relationship and gives the appearance that the staff members are employees of the U.S. Government. This is counter to 3 FAM 3257 a, which states staff employed under official residence expense are employees of the principal representative, not of the U.S. Government. The principal representative (or household manager) will disburse the pay to these employees.
**Recommendation 28:** Embassy Tokyo should require principal officers to pay official residence expense staff salaries directly. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Human Resources**

In accordance with Department cost containment initiatives, Mission Japan outsources all its position and grade classification processing to the Bangkok Regional Classification Center.

*Position Descriptions Are Inaccurate*

Some position descriptions for LE staff members are inaccurate. Missionwide, approximately 13 percent of participants in the OIG’s Local Employee Survey responded that their position descriptions are inaccurate, and 6.3 percent of the participants stated they did not know whether their position descriptions were accurate. This is consistent with what LE staff members told OIG inspectors in interviews. According to 3 FAH-2 H-441.4 b, American supervisors are responsible for ensuring that position descriptions accurately describe staff positions under their direction. According to 3 FAH-2 H-443, the human resources officer is responsible for requesting amendments to position descriptions if existing descriptions are inaccurate and for conducting an annual review of all positions. Inaccurate position descriptions could affect LE staff members’ level of compensation and lower their morale.

**Recommendation 29:** Embassy Tokyo should issue a management announcement to mission staff outlining supervisors’ responsibility for the accuracy of employee position descriptions. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 30:** Embassy Tokyo should review locally employed staff position descriptions for accuracy and appropriate classification of grade and position title and update descriptions as needed. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

*Delays in Processing Within-Grade Increases*

As of March 2015, 18 LE staff members did not receive annual within-grade increases on time because their supervisors failed to complete their performance evaluations by the due date. This occurred despite the supervisors receiving the human resources unit’s notifications and reminders. According to 3 FAH 2 H-135.5 a (2), reports are required each year on the basis of the annual rating cycle. A late report can delay the processing of a within-grade increase, resulting in financial loss to the employee.

**Recommendation 31:** Embassy Tokyo should hold managers accountable for completion of local employees’ performance reviews by the prescribed due date. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

*No Justification for Paying Post Allowance to Family Member Appointees*

Worldwide, Embassies London and Tokyo are the only two authorized to pay post allowance to family member appointees. In 2001, the Department granted them an exception on the basis of their inability to recruit individuals for family member positions because of lower salaries and
wages, in accordance with 3 FAM 8218.1 c. In Japan, these adverse employment conditions no longer exist. Except for security escort positions, the embassy has had no difficulty filling family member positions. It also has been able to fill some of its LE staff vacancies with eligible family members when they meet all position requirements. The cost impact to the embassy of providing the post allowance to nine full-time family members is $59,190, annually.

**Recommendation 32:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should terminate the payment of post allowance to family member appointees. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with DGHR)

**In-House Post Language Program Is Not Cost Effective**

The five constituent posts outsource their post language programs to commercial vendors. The embassy performs this service in house with three part-time LE staff language instructors and has been reluctant to outsource the program. To improve the language instruction for the 13 advanced students, the embassy began piloting individual contract language instruction. Through this pilot program, the embassy found three major advantages: (1) vendors bill the embassy only if a student takes a class or misses a scheduled class, (2) students who find they cannot make their classes (about 20 percent) can voluntarily withdraw, (3) and students have the flexibility to attend the 1-hour class, depending on their schedule and availability. In a cost comparison, the in-house language program cost $201,000 in FY 2014. The estimated cost to outsource the in-house program to commercial vendors is $158,824. According to 6 FAH-5 H-222.6-2, ICASS Councils are encouraged to take a hard look at existing services, consider the selection of other agencies that may be in a cost-effective position to provide quality service, and consider outsourcing.

**Recommendation 33:** Embassy Tokyo should outsource its post language program to commercial vendors. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Locally Employed Staff Committee**

Embassy leadership has an open dialogue with the LE staff committee. The management officer and the DCM meet with committee members monthly. The LE staff committee’s main concern is their salaries. According to the embassy, Mission Japan’s LE staff received their last pay increase in 1995.

**Equal Employment Opportunity**

**No In-House Equal Employment Opportunity Training Provided to Staff**

Approximately 12 percent of participants in OIG’s survey of embassy LE staff responded that they did not know whether they had witnessed or experienced harassment at post. Although no cases were open, the embassy’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselors reported they had received a number of inquiries. Although EEO counselors and supervisors received training, the current EEO counselors had not offered in-house training or programming to non-supervisory staff. As disclosed in the EEO functional questionnaire, some staff members had
never received EEO training. According to 13 FAM 312 c, EEO and diversity training is mandatory for all managers and supervisors, and all employees are strongly encouraged to participate in EEO and diversity awareness training or training containing an EEO and diversity module, on average, every 5 years. EEO and sexual harassment complaints lower office morale and employee productivity. These complaints/cases are also time consuming and can be costly to settle.

**Recommendation 34:** Embassy Tokyo should provide Equal Employment Opportunity and discriminatory harassment training to mission staff. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Allegations of Sexual Harassment Not Reported to the Office of Civil Rights**

In interviews, the OIG team learned that the embassy did not report three complaints of sexual harassment to the Office of Civil Rights as required. Although embassy officials had taken actions to address these complaints, they were unaware of this reporting requirement and told the OIG team they would report these allegations to the Office of Civil Rights. According to 3 FAM 1525. 2-1 c, supervisors and other responsible Department officials who observe, are informed of, or reasonably suspect incidents of possible sexual harassment must report such incidents immediately to the Office of Civil Rights, which will initiate or oversee a prompt investigation. Without adherence to this requirement, sexual harassment complaints could go unreported to the Department.

**Recommendation 35:** Embassy Tokyo should report all allegations of sexual and discriminatory harassment to the Office of Civil Rights, issue a management notice advising that supervisors and other responsible Department officials must report all allegations of sexual harassment to the Office of Civil Rights, and provide sexual harassment training to all mission staff. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

The OIG team also advised the embassy to recruit LE staff EEO liaisons appropriate for the demographics and size of the mission workforce. The sole EEO LE staff liaison is male. Female staff members could feel uncomfortable discussing sexual harassment concerns with a male employee.

**General Services Operations**

The general services office is responsible for customs and shipping, motor pool, property management, procurement, housing, travel, and unclassified mail operations.

**Procurement and Contract Review Are Effective**

In FY 2014, the procurement and contracting unit processed 3,466 procurement actions. All contracts included Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52.222-50, “Combating Trafficking in Persons.” A review of selected procurement actions showed that the procurement staff follows competition and documentation regulations. The OIG team reviewed eight contracts totaling $23.3 million and found the files complete with required documentation.
Mission Tokyo is piloting eFiling (electronic filing) and Ariba Contracts, two new additions to the existing Integrated Logistics Management System modules. Procurement staffs missionwide are adjusting to the new processes and procedures.

No Designated Contracting Officer’s Representative for Some Contracts

Contracting officers have not designated contracting officer’s representatives for the embassy’s travel contract and the maintenance, janitorial, and gardening contracts in Fukuoka and Naha. According to 14 FAH-2 H-143 a, the contracting officer designates the contracting officer’s representative to act as the authorized representative to assist in the technical monitoring or administration of a contract. Inadequate oversight of contract management constitutes a failure to monitor the contractor’s technical progress and the expenditures of resources relating to the contract. Some program managers did not complete the required training and certification requirements.

Recommendation 36: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should designate, train, and certify contracting officer’s representatives for contracts. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

Unauthorized Use of Motor Pool Shuttle Services

Motor pool provides shuttle services to mission employees and private Japanese citizens without approved justification for the use of official vehicles. Consulate General Osaka-Kobe operates a daily shuttle service between the U.S. Government-owned housing compound and the consulate office building. Consulate General Naha offers shuttle services to private Japanese citizens from the consulate office parking lot to the principal officer’s residence for representational events. According to 14 FAM 433.3-1 and 14 FAM 433.3-3, the chief of mission may approve other authorized use of official vehicles when public transportation is unsafe or not available or when such use is advantageous to the U.S. Government.

The mission motor vehicle policy states that public transportation in Japan is safe and reliable, and its use is encouraged. Providing these shuttle services is contrary to FAM guidance and is an additional cost to the mission. The U.S. Mission Japan Policy Regarding the Use of Official Vehicles in effect at the time of the inspection did not explain the need to justify the use of motor pool resources for shuttle services as an "Other Authorized Use," Because of these unclear instructions, the consulates followed the lead of the embassy and provided shuttle services without presenting a specific justification in line with 14 FAM 433.3-1 and 14 FAM 433.3-3, as required.

During the inspection, the embassy discontinued its shuttle service from the housing compound to the chancery.

Recommendation 37: Embassy Tokyo should terminate all shuttle services that have not been justified in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Manual. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
Mission Motor Vehicle Policy Lacks Comprehensive Guidelines

The mission’s motor vehicle policy does not contain well-defined written guidelines on the use of official vehicles for business purposes or other authorized use. The motor pool policy does not cover the operation of shuttles in Tokyo, Naha, and Osaka-Kobe. The motor vehicle policy does not include procedures for the constituent posts, which have unique operating environments, nor does it cover the use of U.S. Government vehicles by other agencies. The motor vehicle operating and safety procedures are vague and too general. According to 14 FAM 432.5, the embassy should include the guidelines in the countrywide policy to ensure safe vehicle operations and adherence to Department rules on the use of official Government vehicles. According to 14 FAM 435 Liability, Insurance, Loss, and Damage, the embassy must inform other authorized drivers of their personal liability and the extent of liability insurance the post has for such drivers. Without specific and clear procedures, employees are uncertain of the embassy’s policies on the use of official vehicles.

**Recommendation 38:** Embassy Tokyo should review and update the Mission’s Motor Vehicle Policy to include the constituent post specific information, other agency use, detailed operating procedures, vehicle safety standards, and liability limits. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Inefficient Use of Motor Pool Staff

Consulate General Naha does not effectively use its primary driver. According to his position description, 70 percent of the driver’s job duties and responsibilities are to serve as the driver for the Consul General and other Consulate General staff as well as visiting officials. In practice, the driver supports only the Consul General, as evidenced by the daily vehicle activity logs. Consulate General Naha staff self-drive and rarely use the driver. In addition, managing motor pool resources is usually the responsibility of the management unit, but on the basis of an agreement made 15 years ago between the front office and the management officer at Consulate General Naha, the principal officer’s executive assistant supervises the driver.

At Consulates General Fukuoka and Sapporo, the principal officers’ drivers fall under the management unit and have other management duties. Reassigning Naha’s driver under the management section provides the unit an additional staff member to assist with the workload. According to 1 FAM 014.1, it is U.S. Government policy to ensure the most effective use of resources by establishing organizational structures that strive to achieve efficiency of operations and effective employee use and improve service delivery and internal management control. Not efficiently employing staff is contrary to the Department’s guidance on the most effective use of Government resources.

**Recommendation 39:** Embassy Tokyo should reassign Consulate General Naha’s primary driver to the management section and assign the driver other management duties in addition to his responsibilities as a driver. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
Housing

Missionwide, the embassy leases 68 residential units, including 2 principal officer’s residences and 8 units under the living quarters allowance program. Total operating lease costs for residential unit are $5.6 million and $738,004 for living quarters allowance.

Living Quarters Allowance Not in Compliance with the Foreign Affairs Manual

Housing acquired under the living quarters allowance program is not in compliance with the policies and standards outlined in 15 FAM 211, Housing Abroad Policy. The housing unit and the post interagency housing board do not apply the same rules and procedures for approving housing assignments for living quarter allowance residences as they do for short-term leases signed by the embassy. For example, the housing board does not review living quarters allowance leases. The post occupational safety and health officer did not complete the mandatory safety inspections or documentation for the eight residential units under the living quarters allowance program. According to 15 FAM 211.2, the policies and standards of the housing policy apply to employees of all agencies serving abroad who come under chief of mission authority, to all U.S. Government-held property, and to housing acquired under living quarters allowance and overseas housing allowance programs. To neglect the policy of reviewing leases and conducting safety inspections creates an undue hardship and risk to personnel who find themselves in irrevocable rental agreements and living in possibly unsafe and unsecure housing.

Recommendation 40: Embassy Tokyo should implement procedures to review leases and conduct residential safety, health, and fire prevention inspections on all living quarters allowance program housing. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Housing Handbook Does Not Include Living Quarters Allowance Policies and Procedures

Embassy Tokyo’s Housing Handbook, dated 2012, does not include policies or procedures for leasing and inspecting housing under the living quarters allowance program. For example, the current housing handbook contains guidelines for conducting security inspections but is missing guidelines for residential safety, health, and fire prevention inspections. The embassy did not conduct the same processes and procedures for living quarters allowance housing as is routinely done for short-term leases and Government-owned housing. As a result, that information was not included in the Housing Handbook. According to 15 FAM 211.1, the objective of the housing program is to provide safe and secure housing that is adequate to meet the personal and professional requirements of employees. Incoming employees rely on information in the handbook. When important information is not included in the housing handbook, residents are not well acquainted with the health and safety measures they should expect in their homes.

Recommendation 41: Embassy Tokyo should update the Embassy Tokyo Housing Handbook to include policies and procedures for leasing and inspecting living quarters allowance housing and performing safety inspections. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
Consulate General Naha Not Benefiting from Zero Cost Leasing Offer

In February 2010, the Open Source Center located on the U.S. Army’s Torii Station offered four Government-owned houses located on Kadena Air Base to Consulate General Naha at zero leasing costs. Consulate General Naha has not fully considered this offer. The OIG team estimates accepting the Open Source Center’s offer would save leasing costs of $110,665 per year. The embassy would continue to fund utility and make-ready costs. In Naha, U.S. direct hires already use base services, including the commissary, Post Exchange, and other support services. U.S. direct-hire dependents attend Department of Defense schools. According to 15 FAM 228 b, housing selection should achieve maximum cost benefit to the U.S. Government, and every effort should be made to lease appropriate housing with terms that reflect the likelihood of the housing unit remaining in posts inventory, with lease terms of 5 years or more whenever appropriate.

Recommendation 42: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should conduct a written cost analysis and feasibility study of providing housing on a military installation in Okinawa. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with OBO)

Real Property

Mission Japan’s Government-owned properties include the embassy office building, three consulate office buildings, the chief of mission residence, the deputy chief of mission residence, a warehouse, the Marine security guard quarters, domestic servants’ quarters, recreational facilities, a language school and director’s residence, 1 principal officer residence, and 179 residential units.

The embassy leases two consulate office buildings and two American centers. The total operating lease cost for office buildings is $1.6 million, annually.

Major Renovations Postponed Indefinitely Because of Funding Limitations

The facilities staff rates the condition of Government-owned properties as fair. Most of the building systems have reached or exceeded their recommended life cycles and require replacement. OBO is aware of the deficiencies and in 2007–2008 proposed a $200-million chancery renovation and a $300-million rehabilitation of the 171-unit housing compound in Tokyo. OBO, however, has had to postpone these projects indefinitely because of insufficient funding. Missionwide, another 41 unfunded projects total $25.5 million. Worldwide, the total backlog of unfunded OBO projects is more than $5.5 billion. Because of funding limitations, OBO has had to correct Mission Japan’s building deficiencies piece-meal. Funded and approved projects include installation of new consular counters, replacement of chancery elevators, and replacement of fan coil unit and piping in the classified access area. The embassy is working to secure funding to replace the heating and air conditioning systems in the chancery and at consulate office buildings.
Private Domestic Staff Inappropriately Housed in U.S. Government-Owned Facility

The embassy continues to house private domestic staff of U.S. direct-hire officers in a separate U.S. Government-owned facility (the former U.S. Marine Dormitory) despite a 2008 Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion cautioning that the legality of operating living quarters for private domestic servants of U.S. Government employees on U.S. Government premises is highly doubtful under Federal appropriations/employment law. The presence of such facilities on U.S. Government-controlled real property also raises liability issues under employment law and tort law. The embassy raised concerns about prior fraudulent domestic staff employment contracts, use of appropriated funds to maintain the facility and collection of utilities reimbursements through the employees association as a probable violation of appropriation law. At the time of inspection, 42 domestic staff resided in the 31-room U.S. Government-owned building designated for domestic staff. According to 15 FAM 244, post personnel may house full-time domestic staff in their own U.S. Government-provided quarters if space is available and approved by the regional security officer. The estimated cost of maintaining the facility is $60,000 per year.

**Recommendation 43:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should terminate housing its private domestic staff of its direct-hire officers in a separate Government-owned facility. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with OBO and L)

Facilities

A small staff of two U.S. direct-hire facility managers and eight LE staff members maintains an inventory of 196 Government-owned properties. The unit outsources most of the facilities function to contractors through 41 contracts totaling $7.3 million for maintenance, janitorial, and gardening services.

No Emergency Backup Generators at Some Constituent Posts

Consulate office buildings in Sapporo and Fukuoka do not have emergency backup generators for their unclassified office areas. The Government-owned housing compounds in Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe, and Sapporo also have no or very limited emergency power generation capabilities. Management believes the local power infrastructure is reliable, negating the need for backup generators. Although the Department has no blanket mandate for all posts to have generator power, the OIG team believes it is prudent for the embassy to evaluate each constituent post’s needs for generator power, given the 2011 natural disasters that occurred in Japan. According to 15 FAM 645.3-1, post must submit emergency power requirements to OBO for review, approval, and funding. Without backup generators, the consulate office buildings could be without power during emergencies.

**Recommendation 44:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should conduct a review and determine each constituent post’s emergency generator power requirements. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with OBO)
Safety, Health, and Environmental Management

The Department’s Office of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management conducted visits to all Mission Japan posts during 2014 and continues to track compliance with its 125 recommendations. The embassy completed 26 recommendations and is working to address the remaining 99. These recommendations are subject to OBO’s internal compliance procedures.

Fire Safety

The Department’s Office of Fire Safety conducted visits in 2014. The report identified 83 deficiencies of which the mission has corrected 53.

Information Management

Mission Japan’s information management offices are meeting the mission’s operational needs. They continue to improve administrative efficiencies with locally developed software applications and are working to improve emergency preparedness by upgrading the current emergency and evacuation network. An aging 14-year-old telephone system, strict radio operating guidelines from the host government, and a steady demand for technical support to visiting delegations present challenges. The OIG team identified network security, privacy regulation compliance, and physical security as areas for improvement.

The OIG team also advised section managers on the need to post access lists for the classified pouch and mailroom workers, improve communications security and system administrator training at constituent posts, and cross-train employees in order to improve technical coverage. The embassy corrected these deficiencies during the inspection.

Recommendation 45: [Redacted] (b) (5)
Recommendation 46:  

**Commercial Email Usage**

In the course of its inspection, OIG received reports concerning embassy staff use of private email accounts to conduct official business. On the basis of these reports, OIG’s Office of Evaluations and Special Projects conducted a review and confirmed that senior embassy staff, including the Ambassador, used personal email accounts to send and receive messages containing official business. In addition, OIG identified instances where emails labeled Sensitive but Unclassified were sent from, or received by, personal email accounts.

OIG has previously reported on the risks associated with using commercial email for official Government business. Such risks include data loss, hacking, phishing, and spoofing of email accounts, as well as inadequate protections for personally identifiable information. Department policy is that employees generally should not use private email accounts (for example, Gmail, AOL, Yahoo, and so forth) for official business. Employees are also expected to use approved, secure methods to transmit Sensitive but Unclassified information when available and practical.

**Locally Developed Software Applications Not in Compliance**

Embassy Tokyo’s information systems center actively develops local applications to support the embassy’s day-to-day operations. It is currently using five different applications that LE staff members developed. The applications support telephone billing processes, diplomatic note tracking, document control, and in-and-out processing procedures. Although the applications

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6 Sensitive but unclassified information is information that is not classified for national security reasons, but that warrants/requires administrative control and protection from public or other unauthorized disclosure for other reasons.

7 11 STATE 65111; 14 STATE 128030

8 12 FAM 544.3
make administrative processes more efficient, they are not in compliance with Department standards.

The local information technology configuration control board have not approved Embassy Tokyo’s locally developed applications. The embassy established a local information technology configuration control board, but the board has not documented its approval of each application. Members of the board were not aware of the approval requirement. In order to comply with 5 FAM 864 c, the embassy’s local information technology control board must approve each software application. Applications that have not been properly reviewed and approved risk introducing additional vulnerabilities in to the existing local information technology infrastructure.

**Recommendation 47:** Embassy Tokyo should convene its local information technology configuration control board to review each locally developed application and approve, as appropriate. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

The embassy’s locally developed application for newly arrived officers, called e-Checkin, does not comply with Federal and Department privacy regulations. The application gathers personally identifiable information of incoming officers and their family members; however, currently no privacy impact assessment is available for the e-Checkin application. Tokyo’s application developers were not aware of the requirement to conduct a privacy impact assessment. According to 5 FAM 466 a, a privacy impact assessment must be performed on information technology systems collecting or maintaining electronic information about Department workforce members. Without conducting a privacy impact assessment, Embassy Tokyo cannot fully understand the risks and effect of collecting and maintaining personally identifiable information in the e-Checkin application.

**Recommendation 48:** Embassy Tokyo should perform a privacy impact assessment on the e-Checkin application. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Emergency Communication Does Not Meet Department Standards**

The embassy is operating an emergency and evacuation radio network in the Tokyo and Yokohama areas. The embassy’s current policy calls for radios to be distributed to approximately 50 percent of Department employees. The network does not extend to the mission’s five constituent posts because these posts have not yet received Japanese Government approval to operate radios in their respective prefectures. The process of obtaining Japanese Government approval has been ongoing since October 2005. Although the embassy has been forward thinking about how it distributes its emergency and evacuation radios, the current distribution plan does not comply with Department standards.

Embassy Tokyo has not distributed emergency and evacuation radios to most Department employees in the mission. The current distribution plan focuses on assigning radios to personnel living off the embassy’s housing compound and to approximately 50 percent of Department employees living on the compound. In order to comply with 5 FAH-2 H-713.4, the embassy must assign radios to all or most Department employees in the mission. Failure to properly distribute
emergency evacuation radios reduces the security and protection of U.S. Government personnel in the mission

**Recommendation 49:** Embassy Tokyo should assign radios to no fewer than 51 percent of Department of State employees in the mission. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Agencies that are not part of the Department are not funding the radios they are operating on the mission’s emergency and evacuation network. The embassy distributed radios to other agency personnel but did not establish a process for their respective agencies to fund the radios and related equipment. According to 5 FAM 545 d, other agencies must fund their own radios that are being used on the emergency and evacuation. Failing to properly fund equipment leads to increased costs incurred by the Department.

**Recommendation 50:** Embassy Tokyo should require other agencies to pay for the radios they are using on the mission’s emergency and evacuation network. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**No Logs of Network Maintenance**

Consulate General Osaka-Kobe’s systems administrators are not logging the maintenance that is performed on their network servers. The administrators are performing daily maintenance, but they have not incorporated system maintenance logging into their standard operating procedures. Administrators were not logging maintenance performed on network servers because of competing priorities. According to 12 FAM 622.5 a(5), the information management office must maintain system maintenance logs for at least 6 months. If maintenance is not logged, Consulate General Osaka-Kobe cannot be certain it has a full understanding of the network infrastructure when troubleshooting issues.

**Recommendation 51:** Embassy Tokyo should include system maintenance logging into the standard operating procedures for all the mission’s information technology networks. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 52:** [Redacted] (b) (5)
SECURITY

The Tokyo regional security office is responsible for the security and emergency preparedness of a large geographically dispersed diplomatic mission. In discussions and interviews with embassy staff members, the OIG team was told repeatedly that the regional security office is responsive to their needs. Accomplishments of the senior regional security officer include reinvigorating the law enforcement working group, updating and drafting missing or outdated security policies, and implementing modifications to the local guard contract that save the Department approximately $230,000 annually. The regional security office staff uniformly describes the senior regional security officer as a good mentor and communicator.

MISSION SUPPORT SERVICES

According to the Department’s Post Profile, U.S. direct-hire employees receive a 20- to 35-percent post cost-of-living allowance based on location.

Health Unit

The regional medical officer based in Tokyo provides medical coverage for Mission Japan. A regional psychiatrist, also based in Tokyo, covers Mission Japan, the Philippines, and the Pacific Islands. A part-time local physician and three part-time LE staff registered nurses also provide medical coverage. OIG inspectors found that the unit is well equipped and accounts for supplies and controlled substances in accordance with Department regulations.

Community Liaison Office

A full-time community liaison coordinator, assisted by two part-time assistant community liaison coordinators, arranges a full range of community-building activities for embassy staff and families. A de facto work agreement with the Government of Japan allows family members to apply for work permits with strict rules governing employment. Twenty-seven eligible family members are employed inside the mission, and 34 eligible family members are employed outside the mission, mostly as English teachers.

American Employee’s Welfare Association

The Embassy Tokyo American Employee’s Welfare Association is profitable. Embassy management is considering making a request that the association take over the operation and maintenance of the fitness center and cable television subscriptions at the Mitsui housing
compound, where most American officers live. Currently, the embassy pays monthly cable television fees for American officers who reside at Mitsui. Because cable television is for personal use, the embassy believes that employees should pay for the service directly or through the association. The OIG team supports these two requests because it reduces the embassy’s administrative burden.

**American Employee’s Welfare Association Convenience Store Operates at a Loss**

In 2014, the American Employee’s Welfare Association convenience store operated at a loss of $60,897 because of high overhead costs. According to 6 FAM 531.5, employee associations must ensure that each revenue-generating cost center is financially self-sustaining and that the profits of one cost center are not unduly subsidizing another cost center. Without sufficient profits, the store cannot cover its operating expenses or liabilities.

**Recommendation 53:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should require the Tokyo Employee’s Welfare Association to review its operations and revise its business plan to make services self-supporting. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

**American Employee’s Welfare Association Lacks Capital Investment Plan**

The Tokyo American Employee’s Welfare Association does not have a long-term plan or strategy for using its excess funding totaling $487,000. A plan was not developed to use funds from excess profits. According to 6 FAM 531.4, employee associations with excessive amounts of retained earnings may be required to provide the Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs with a management plan for the use of such funds. Without a capital investment strategy, no prioritized plan is in place for improvement of facilities or procurement of replacement furniture and equipment.

**Recommendation 54:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should require the American Employee’s Welfare Association to develop and submit to the Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs a capital investment strategy for use of its excess funding. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

**Schools**

Seventy-eight percent of U.S. direct-hire dependent children attend three schools in Tokyo: The remaining dependents attend nine other schools. Representatives of the embassy sit on two school boards: The regional education officer visited 10 schools on October 1–6, 2012, and found no major issues with the education provided. In 2012–2013, the regional education officer visited Department-approved schools in Sapporo, Osaka-Kobe, Nagoya, and Fukuoka.
MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

The annual chief of mission management controls statement of assurance, dated August 18, 2014, stated that the embassy completed all required internal management control reviews. The embassy’s evaluation of the systems of management controls provided reasonable assurance that the embassy achieved the referenced management control objectives. The statement disclosed no deficiencies.

No Periodic Unannounced Reviews of Locally Employed Staff Certifying Activity

The financial management officer is not conducting periodic unannounced reviews of LE staff certifying activity. The financial management officer performs a cursory review of certified payments in the financial system, but this is not sufficient. According to 4 FAH-3 H-065. 2-2 d, the financial management officer should review a newly designated LE staff certifying officer monthly for the first 6 months following the designation. After 6 months, the officer may conduct the review quarterly. Not conducting these reviews of voucher payments is an internal control weakness that could lead to fraudulent payments.

**Recommendation 55:** Embassy Tokyo should conduct and document unannounced quarterly reviews of locally employed staff certifying activity. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Actual Lodging Cost Not Properly Justified

The embassy has paid travelers for actual lodging (rather than per diem) when actual subsistence was not justified, resulting in overpayments to travelers and violation of 14 FAM 572.2 and 14 FAM 756. Although actual lodging was approved on the blanket travel authorization, neither the authorization nor the travel voucher contained evidence that actual lodging expenses were justified. Staff did not follow guidelines for authorizing actual lodging costs. According to 14 FAM 515, the traveler is responsible for repaying charges incurred through failure to comply with regulations regardless of who may have assisted the traveler in making the arrangements.

According to 4 FAM 492.1, the management, financial management, or program officer at the post, bureau, or office responsible for the allotment, activity, or program under which the debt arises is responsible for debit determinations. According to 4 FAM 493.1-1, all debtors must be notified of their indebtedness, and the management, financial management, or program officer at the post, bureau, or office responsible for the allotment, activity, or program under which the debt arises must make the initial collection effort. If the mission is unable to collect the debt, the debt should be referred to the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services Accounts Receivable.

**Recommendation 56:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should review the travel documentation where actual costs were claimed, notify the employee of the indebtedness, and initiate collection. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CGFS)
Premium Class Train Travel Policy Does Not Comply with Department Regulations

Since FY 2006, it has been the mission’s policy that the Ambassador, employees of the mission who accompany the Ambassador on official travel, and couriers are authorized to travel by reserved seating in the “Green Car” (premium class) when traveling by train because of required privacy and mission needs. The embassy incorrectly interpreted the FAM provisions. According to 14 FAM 567.1, U.S. Government employees who travel by train or vessel (steamer) must use coach-class accommodations or the lowest class of steamer accommodations. When adequate, reserved coach accommodations (trains) or the lowest class accommodations (steamers) are available, officials authorizing travel must require that those accommodations be used to the maximum extent possible. According to 14 FAM 567.1-4, the use of the lowest class (coach or economy) of service available by rail is deemed advantageous without regard to specific trains and should be used when available or when circumstances permit. Approving officials may authorize domestic extra-fare train service when it is determined to be more advantageous to the U.S. Government or is required for security reasons. In addition, according to 14 FAM 567.1-2, the use of business or first-class accommodation may not be authorized strictly on the basis of position or rank. With this incorrect interpretation of regulations, the embassy is incurring additional costs.

Recommendation 57: Embassy Tokyo should revise its premium class train travel policy and issue a management notice advising employees that train travel at Government expense is only authorized using coach-class accommodations. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Extra Travel Costs Inappropriately Approved for Using Indirect Routes

In its review of travel vouchers, the OIG team found occasions when employees traveled on official orders but used indirect routes and were reimbursed for the extra cost incurred for travel and per diem. Staff members did not follow guidelines for authorizing travel by indirect routes. According to 14 FAM 561.2, an employee traveling on official business is expected to exercise the same care in incurring expenses that a prudent person would exercise if traveling on personal business and expending personal funds. Excess costs, circuitous routes, delays, or luxury accommodations and services unnecessary or unjustified in the performance of official business are not acceptable under this standard. The effect is that the Government ends up paying the excess costs for indirect travel. Employees are responsible for excess costs and any additional expenses incurred for personal preference or convenience. According to 14 FAM 564.2, an employee may purchase a restricted or penalty fare for official travel for personal convenience (for example, the employee is taking an indirect route for personal reasons), but the employee is responsible for any and all penalties incurred in connection with such fares. Reimbursement limitations for employees taking indirect routes are in 14 FAM 585.2-2.

Recommendation 58: Embassy Tokyo should examine travel vouchers involving indirect travel of employees and resubmit those that were not reimbursed in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Manual to the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services for review. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
**LE Staff Members Incorrectly Approving Travel in Public Affairs**

The public affairs section incorrectly allows LE staff administrative assistants to approve travel for U.S. direct-hire staff. The public affairs section was unaware of 4 FAM 465.3, which states before a voucher claiming reimbursement of travel expenses is presented to the certifying officer for certification, an official—who has a requisite personal knowledge that the traveler performed the travel during the period claimed or who is responsible for supervising the traveler—must administratively approve the voucher. This arrangement has led to travel and expenses that are not in the best interest of the U.S. Government.

**Recommendation 59:** Embassy Tokyo should designate U.S. direct-hire supervisors within the public affairs section as approving officials for all travel. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Inappropriate Use of Official Residence Expense Funds Instead of Representation Funds**

Since 2000, Consulate General Naha has used official residence expense funds, which are charged to diplomatic and consular program funding, instead of representation funds to hire additional staff to work at representational events, which is contrary to guidance in 3 FAM 3256(1) and DSSR 320 f. The consulate staff was unaware of the FAM and standard regulations prohibiting this practice. Use of the wrong funding source could constitute a violation of the Purpose Statute and an Anti-Deficiency Act violation if the mission’s use of official residence expense program funds for expenses which would have been more properly charged to representational funds causes the allotment holder to exceed its representation allotment (2010 State 31921 and 4 FAH-3 H-122.1 b). According to 4 FAM 088, potential Anti-Deficiency Act violations should be reported to the allotment holder, the regional bureau in this case, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Global Financial Services. Those offices will determine whether the regional bureau’s allotment was exceeded and whether restitution or other administrative discipline—administered by the Bureau of Human Resource’s Office of Conduct, Suitability, and Discipline—is warranted.

**Recommendation 60:** Embassy Tokyo should report the potential Anti-Deficiency Act violation that occurred by using Diplomatic and Consular Program funding rather than representation funding to pay official representation expenses to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 61:** The Bureau of East Asian Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should determine whether the regional bureau’s representation allotment was exceeded and whether administrative discipline is warranted. (Action: EAP, in coordination with CGFS)

As required by 4 FAM 374 a, as soon as it is determined that the probability of an irregularity exists, the principal officer of an embassy notifies the Department with Attention to the Director, Office of Financial Policy. According to 4 FAM 374, this improper certification of funds and fiscal irregularity must be reported to the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Service’s Office of Financial Policy, which will determine if the certifying officer should be held personally responsible.
liable to repay the amount of any illegal or improper payment resulting from the certification. According to 31 United States Code Section 3528, the certifying officer can be held liable for a payment that “does not represent a legal obligation under the appropriation or fund involved.” The embassy was unaware that fiscal irregularity might have occurred, which could result in an Anti-Deficiency Act violation.

Recommendation 62: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should report the circumstances surrounding the charging of official residence expense program fund instead of the representation fund. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CGFS)

In addition to charging the incorrect fund, Consulate General Naha used the wrong document to procure services for additional wait staff for representational events. Whether this action is an unauthorized commitment depends upon the Bureau of Administration’s determination of whether the contracting officer or principal officer was responsible for procuring the services. According to 14 FAH 2 H-132 b, an unauthorized commitment occurs when someone other than a warranted contracting officer commits the U.S. Government to a contractual action, such as directing a contractor to perform work or deliver items. This circumvents management controls. Having an unauthorized staff member procure items could result in the U.S. Government being legally bound to pay for services or goods.

Recommendation 63: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should determine whether the procuring of additional wait staff for representational events using an improper obligating document represents an unauthorized commitment. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

Consular Management Controls

Inappropriate Use of Doors to Consular Waiting Room

Tokyo’s consular personnel, as well as contract greeters, frequently pass back and forth between the consular section work area and the consular waiting room. An embassy tracking system recorded 290 such trips taken by 34 different individuals over a 4-day period. This routine movement has security implications that are addressed in the classified annex to this report. Staff members moving in and out of the waiting room—where managers have limited line-of-sight—also presents management control and oversight problems. According to 7 FAH-1 H-644.1, consular officers should maintain line-of-sight supervision of sensitive work areas whenever possible. The ability of consular staff to move freely and rapidly in and out of the waiting room, interacting with the clients in an area with limited line-of-sight supervision, invites opportunities for, and creates the perception of, impropriety. The OIG team discussed alternative procedural options with consular managers.

Recommendation 64: Embassy Tokyo should implement procedures to prohibit consular personnel from using the doors between the waiting room and the consular office area, except in emergencies. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
Daily Setting of Consular Exchange Rates Creates Unnecessary Work

Following long-standing tradition, directed by the financial management office, the embassy sets the exchange rate for consular fees each day according to the international exchange rate. Resetting the rates daily creates significant work for consular cashiers and accountable consular officers. It also requires that the cashiers collect different fees for the same services from one day to the next and to maintain a large supply of small coins.

Language in 7 FAH 1 H-724.2 a and b authorizes the accountable consular officer to establish a consular exchange rate that remains constant, as long as the international rates stay within a certain band. This practice saves time for consular cashiers and the accountable consular officers and provides greater stability of cost-for-services in local currency.

Recommendation 65: Embassy Tokyo should establish a consular exchange rate and review the rate on a monthly schedule or when the international rate exceeds that of the consular rate. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should upgrade the rank of the economic and political minister counselor positions at Embassy Tokyo to Senior Foreign Service class of minister counselor. (Action: EAP, in coordination with DGHR)

**Recommendation 2:** Embassy Tokyo should streamline the economic section by eliminating the deputy unit chief designation in the trade and economic policy unit and in the environment, science, technology, and health unit. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 3:** Embassy Tokyo should eliminate the standalone deputy function in the economic section and assign the current incumbent of the position to lead the trade and economic policy unit. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Tokyo should update the description for position 20466000 to eliminate the division of reporting responsibilities between the financial attaché and the economic section so that the officer reports solely to the financial attaché and through the attaché to the economic minister counselor. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Tokyo should shift supervision of its locally employed economic assistants and specialists to the section’s two unit chiefs. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 6:** The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should abolish position 20439000 in the economic section effective upon the departure of the current incumbent. (Action: EAP, in coordination with DGHR)

**Recommendation 7:** The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should move position 10641000 from the political to the public affairs section. (Action: EAP, in coordination with DGHR)

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Tokyo should implement a political reporting plan that includes a contact development program. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Tokyo should update its economic reporting plan and focus resources on contact development and analytical reporting. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Tokyo should implement a standardized filing system for the economic section that uses common-use drives or folders. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Tokyo should establish a regular science cluster and an economic policy cluster coordinated by the economic minister counselor. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
Recommendation 12: Embassy Tokyo should require each principal officer to draft a reporting plan that includes reporting performance in principal officers’ performance evaluations. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 13: Embassy Tokyo should develop and implement a public diplomacy strategy. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 14: Embassy Tokyo should incorporate fully the American Center Japan into its public affairs strategy. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 15: Embassy Tokyo should establish an internal speakers program. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 16: The embassy should conduct a customer survey and a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the Media Analysis and Translation Team’s products are needed to further embassy goals. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 17: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, should develop a scope of work and establish clear guidelines governing the work of the Media Analysis and Translation Team. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with EAP)

Recommendation 18: Embassy Tokyo should designate a locally employed staff position in the public affairs section to act as coordinator for digital and social media activities. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 19: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should comply with Department of State regulations for grants management oversight, including scheduling periodic review by grants officers and grants officer representatives. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

Recommendation 20: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should request that the Bureau of Human Resources eliminate the deputy unit chief positions in the visa and American citizens services units (position numbers 31144000 and 34657000) when the incumbents complete their tours. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 21: Embassy Tokyo should shift direct supervision of the consular communication unit to the Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 22: The Bureau of Consular Affairs should provide guidance to consular managers regarding how to comply with Department requirements to review issued passport applications. (Action: CA)

Recommendation 23: Embassy Tokyo should cease offering routine consular services at American Presence Post Nagoya. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
Recommendation 24: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of providing consular services in Fukuoka and Sapporo. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 25: The Foreign Service Institute, in coordination with Embassy Tokyo, should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it should outsource or continue to perform in house the overseas portion of the Japanese-Language training program. (Action: FSI, in coordination with Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 26: Embassy Tokyo should justify its rationale for providing in-house accommodation exchange and determine whether it should continue. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 27: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should conduct a review of cash requirements to determine an adequate level of the cashier’s permanent advance. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CGFS)

Recommendation 28: Embassy Tokyo should require principal officers to pay official residence expense staff salaries directly. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 29: Embassy Tokyo should issue a management announcement to mission staff outlining supervisors’ responsibility for the accuracy of employee position descriptions. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 30: Embassy Tokyo should review locally employed staff position descriptions for accuracy and appropriate classification of grade and position title and update descriptions as needed. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 31: Embassy Tokyo should hold managers accountable for completion of local employees’ performance reviews by the prescribed due date. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 32: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should terminate the payment of post allowance to family member appointees. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with DGHR)

Recommendation 33: Embassy Tokyo should outsource its post language program to commercial vendors. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 34: Embassy Tokyo should provide Equal Employment Opportunity and discriminatory harassment training to mission staff. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 35: Embassy Tokyo should report all allegations of sexual and discriminatory harassment to the Office of Civil Rights, issue a management notice advising that supervisors and other responsible Department officials must report all allegations of
sexual harassment to the Office of Civil Rights, and provide sexual harassment training to all mission staff. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 36:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should designate, train, and certify contracting officer’s representatives for contracts. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

**Recommendation 37:** Embassy Tokyo should terminate all shuttle services that have not been justified in accordance with the *Foreign Affairs Manual.* (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 38:** Embassy Tokyo should review and update the Mission’s Motor Vehicle Policy to include the constituent post specific information, other agency use, detailed operating procedures, vehicle safety standards, and liability limits. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 39:** Embassy Tokyo should reassign Consulate General Naha’s primary driver to the management section and assign the driver other management duties in addition to his responsibilities as a driver. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 40:** Embassy Tokyo should implement procedures to review leases and conduct residential safety, health, and fire prevention inspections on all living quarters allowance program housing. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 41:** Embassy Tokyo should update the Embassy Tokyo Housing Handbook to include policies and procedures for leasing and inspecting living quarters allowance housing and performing safety inspections. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

**Recommendation 42:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should conduct a written cost analysis and feasibility study of providing housing on a military installation in Okinawa. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with OBO)

**Recommendation 43:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should terminate housing its private domestic staff of its direct-hire officers in a separate Government-owned facility. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with OBO and L)

**Recommendation 44:** Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should conduct a review and determine each constituent post’s emergency generator power requirements. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with OBO)

**Recommendation 45:** [Redacted] (b) (5)

**Recommendation 46:** [Redacted] (b) (5)
Recommendation 47: Embassy Tokyo should convene its local information technology configuration control board to review each locally developed application and approve, as appropriate. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 48: Embassy Tokyo should perform a privacy impact assessment on the e-Check-in application. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 49: Embassy Tokyo should assign radios to no fewer than 51 percent of Department of State employees in the mission. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 50: Embassy Tokyo should require other agencies to pay for the radios they are using on the mission’s emergency and evacuation network. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 51: Embassy Tokyo should include system maintenance logging into the standard operating procedures for all the mission’s information technology networks. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 52: [Redacted] (b) (5)

Recommendation 53: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should require the Tokyo Employee’s Welfare Association to review its operations and revise its business plan to make services self-supporting. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

Recommendation 54: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should require the American Employee’s Welfare Association to develop and submit to the Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs a capital investment strategy for use of its excess funding. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

Recommendation 55: Embassy Tokyo should conduct and document unannounced quarterly reviews of locally employed staff certifying activity. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 56: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should review the travel documentation where actual costs were claimed, notify the employee of the indebtedness, and initiate collection. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CGFS)

Recommendation 57: Embassy Tokyo should revise its premium class train travel policy and issue a management notice advising employees that train travel at Government expense is only authorized using coach-class accommodations. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 58: Embassy Tokyo should examine travel vouchers involving indirect travel of employees and resubmit those that were not reimbursed in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Manual to the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services for review. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
Recommendation 59: Embassy Tokyo should designate U.S. direct-hire supervisors within the public affairs section as approving officials for all travel. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 60: Embassy Tokyo should report the potential Anti-Deficiency Act violation that occurred by using Diplomatic and Consular Program funding rather than representation funding to pay official representation expenses to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 61: The Bureau of East Asian Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should determine whether the regional bureau’s representation allotment was exceeded and whether administrative discipline is warranted. (Action: EAP, in coordination with CGFS)

Recommendation 62: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should report the circumstances surrounding the charging of official residence expense program fund instead of the representation fund. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with CGFS)

Recommendation 63: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should determine whether the procuring of additional wait staff for representational events using an improper obligating document represents an unauthorized commitment. (Action: Embassy Tokyo, in coordination with A)

Recommendation 64: Embassy Tokyo should implement procedures to prohibit consular personnel from using the doors between the waiting room and the consular office area, except in emergencies. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)

Recommendation 65: Embassy Tokyo should establish a consular exchange rate and review the rate on a monthly schedule or when the international rate exceeds that of the consular rate. (Action: Embassy Tokyo)
# PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chiefs of Mission:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>Caroline Bouvier Kennedy</td>
<td>11/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
<td>Jason P. Hyland</td>
<td>06/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Constituent Post(s):</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consulate General Fukuoka, Principal Officer</td>
<td>Yuriy R. Fedkiw</td>
<td>09/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Presence Post Nagoya, Principal Officer</td>
<td>Stephen Kovacsics</td>
<td>06/2014</td>
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<td>Consulate General Naha, Consul General</td>
<td>Alfred R. Magleby</td>
<td>08/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consulate General Osaka-Kobe, Consul General</td>
<td>Allen S. Greenberg</td>
<td>08/2014</td>
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<td>Consulate General Sapporo, Principal Officer</td>
<td>JoEllen Gorg</td>
<td>09/2013</td>
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<td><strong>Chiefs of Sections:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Paul A. Wedderien</td>
<td>05/2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consular</td>
<td>Steven S. Maloney</td>
<td>08/2013</td>
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<td>Political</td>
<td>Donna A. Welton</td>
<td>06/2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Jessica M. Webster</td>
<td>07/2013</td>
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<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>Margot Carrington</td>
<td>08/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Security</td>
<td>Justin J. Otto</td>
<td>09/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other Agencies:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>James D. O’Leary, Captain (U.S. Navy)</td>
<td>07/2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Liaison Office</td>
<td>John S. Kim, Colonel (U.S. Army)</td>
<td>08/2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Commercial Service</td>
<td>Andrew Wylegala</td>
<td>08/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>David C. Miller</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
<td>Michelle Parker</td>
<td>06/2014</td>
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<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
<td>Brendan C. O’Hearn</td>
<td>07/2013</td>
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<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
<td>James T. Spillane</td>
<td>01/2012</td>
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<td>Department of the Treasury</td>
<td>Christopher D. Winship</td>
<td>08/2012</td>
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<td>Department of Justice</td>
<td>Shelagh J. Sayers</td>
<td>01/2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
<td>Louis A. D’Ambrosio</td>
<td>06/2012</td>
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APPENDIX A: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector’s Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

In conducting inspections, the inspectors review pertinent records; as appropriate, circulate, review, and compile the results of survey instruments; conduct onsite interviews; and review the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.

For this inspection, OIG inspectors conducted 86 formal interviews in Washington, DC, Charleston, South Carolina, and Bangkok, Thailand, and 487 formal interviews in Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe, Fukuoka, Naha, Sapporo, and Nagoya, Japan. They reviewed 374 surveys from American and LE staff members of Embassy Tokyo and its constituent posts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>A/OPE</td>
<td>Office of the Procurement Executive of the Federal Assistance Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBG</td>
<td>Broadcasting Board of Governors</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Deputy chief of mission</td>
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<td>EEO</td>
<td>Equal Employment Opportunity</td>
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<td>FAH</td>
<td><em>Foreign Affairs Handbook</em></td>
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<td>FAM</td>
<td><em>Foreign Affairs Manual</em></td>
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<td>ICASS</td>
<td>International Cooperative Administrative Support Services</td>
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<td>LE</td>
<td>Locally employed</td>
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<td>LEWG</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATT</td>
<td>Media Analysis and Translation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCCA</td>
<td>Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBO</td>
<td>Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS

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